by Nate Hagens
This is a very long and very good piece. so I have converted it to a PDF file for you to down load here.
by Nate Hagens
This is a very long and very good piece. so I have converted it to a PDF file for you to down load here.
The cost of maintaining an economy built for growth
National Grid’s rapidly increasing debt provides another indication of the growing difficulty of maintaining Britain’s industrial infrastructure in an economy that is already shrinking.
According to an article by Jonathan Leake in The Telegraph on 8 November 2026, National Grid has accumulated net debts of £48 billion, expected to reach between £60 billion and £70 billion by 2031. Much of this borrowing is associated with the enormous investment required to expand and modernise Britain’s electricity transmission and distribution networks.
The important question is not simply whether National Grid can repay its debts. It is whether British households and businesses can continue to support the increasing financial cost of an electricity system designed around expectations of continuing economic growth.
This is particularly relevant to Localism.
Borrowing against the future
For several generations, Britain’s economic system has operated on the assumption that future economic activity would be greater than present activity. Borrowing was therefore considered reasonable because future incomes, profits and taxation would provide the means of repayment.
National Grid operates within this same financial framework.
Its investment is financed partly through borrowing, with the cost recovered from electricity consumers through charges approved by Ofgem. Under the Regulated Asset Base system, investment increases the value of the company’s regulated assets, allowing it to recover costs and earn a return over time.
There is an important distinction here. Borrowing to construct essential infrastructure is not inherently irresponsible. Electricity networks require substantial investment, and spreading the cost over many years can be sensible.
The difficulty arises when the ability of consumers to meet those future costs is taken for granted.
In a shrinking economy, that assumption becomes increasingly questionable.
The energy cost of energy
The underlying problem is more fundamental than National Grid’s borrowing.
The industrial economy developed through access to abundant, relatively inexpensive surplus energy. Energy was available not merely to sustain existing economic activity but to expand production, transport, consumption and the infrastructure supporting them.
As the Energy Cost of Energy (ECoE) increases, a greater proportion of the energy obtained must be used to obtain, process and deliver further energy.
The consequence is a reduction in the surplus energy available to support the wider economy.
This affects the affordability of everything from food production and manufacturing to public services and household consumption.
An electricity network can distribute energy, but it cannot create the surplus energy on which economic prosperity depends.
Investment in additional transmission capacity may improve efficiency, reliability and access to renewable generation. Nevertheless, it also requires materials, energy, skilled labour and financial resources.
The distinction between increasing the physical capacity of an electricity system and increasing the affordable surplus energy available to society is crucial.
A financial burden that cannot easily be avoided
The Telegraph article reports that electricity network charges already account for approximately £250 of an average household’s annual electricity bill.
It also cites projections suggesting that annual transmission charges across the system could increase from £4.2 billion in 2024-25 to £13.6 billion by 2030-31.
These are system-wide charges rather than National Grid’s debt repayments alone, but they demonstrate the scale of the financial commitments being made.
The consequences extend well beyond household electricity bills.
Electricity is essential to virtually every part of the economy. Higher network charges increase costs for manufacturers, shops, food producers, hospitals and public services.
Businesses must either absorb these increases, pass them on to customers or reduce their activities.
Households facing higher essential expenditure have less money available for discretionary purchases.
This is particularly significant because discretionary consumption has become such an important part of the consumer economy.
As expenditure on essentials rises, the market for non-essential goods and services contracts. Employment and incomes in those activities consequently come under increasing pressure.
A process of economic contraction can therefore reinforce itself.
The contradiction at the heart of the system
National Grid’s investment programme assumes that Britain must construct an increasingly extensive and sophisticated electricity network to meet future requirements.
Yet the economy that is expected to pay for this infrastructure is experiencing a reduction in its capacity to support expenditure.
The contradiction is not necessarily that Britain will consume less electricity. Electrification of heating, transport and industry could increase electricity demand even while overall economic activity declines.
The contradiction concerns affordability.
An economy may require more electricity for essential purposes while possessing less financial capacity to pay for the infrastructure supplying it.
National Grid’s financial arrangements are designed to provide investors with predictable returns. But the households and businesses funding those returns have no equivalent guarantee of increasing incomes.
The company’s assets may grow in value while the economic circumstances of its customers deteriorate.
This exposes a weakness in a financial model that treats future income as sufficiently dependable to support continuously expanding financial commitments.
What happens when consumers cannot pay?
The Telegraph reports that household energy debts have increased from approximately £1.1 billion five years ago to at least £5 billion.
This is a warning.
Electricity is an essential service. Unlike discretionary purchases, it cannot simply be abandoned when household incomes fall.
As bills increase, households may reduce consumption, accumulate debt or cut expenditure elsewhere.
There are limits to all three responses.
The resulting financial pressure does not disappear. It moves through the economic system, affecting energy suppliers, network operators, creditors and ultimately other consumers or taxpayers.
The comparison with Thames Water is instructive, although the companies’ financial circumstances are different.
Both demonstrate the potential difficulties of financing essential infrastructure through substantial borrowing supported by payments from customers who have little practical choice about using the service.
An essential service cannot ultimately be sustained by financial arrangements that its users can no longer afford.
The implications for Localism
Localism does not mean that every community should become electrically independent.
A national electricity transmission system will remain essential. Large generating stations, national balancing arrangements and major transmission infrastructure are functions that cannot sensibly be reproduced in every locality.
However, the changing economic circumstances of Britain may encourage a different relationship between national infrastructure and local energy provision.
Local generation, including rooftop solar electricity, small-scale renewable installations and appropriate battery storage, can reduce dependence on electricity purchased from the wider system.
Local energy arrangements may also encourage more careful matching of production and consumption.
They cannot eliminate the need for the national grid, nor do they automatically remove network charges. Their usefulness depends on costs, local conditions, seasonal variations and the continuing need for reliable supplies.
Nevertheless, they illustrate how economic adaptation can emerge from the decisions of households, businesses and communities rather than from a centrally imposed programme.
As energy becomes more expensive, people naturally seek ways of reducing consumption, avoiding unnecessary expenditure and making better use of resources available locally.
These responses are consistent with the evolution towards Localism.
The difference between essential and discretionary energy use
A shrinking economy makes the distinction between essential and discretionary activity increasingly important.
Electricity required for food preservation, water supplies, healthcare, communications and essential manufacturing will continue to be needed.
Electricity supporting some forms of discretionary consumption may become less affordable as household incomes decline.
This does not mean that discretionary activities will disappear. It means that their economic importance and the resources available to support them are likely to diminish.
The electricity system must consequently adapt to changing patterns of demand rather than assume that the patterns established during the consumer era will continue indefinitely.
Investment decisions based on forecasts of perpetual economic expansion may become increasingly difficult to justify.
This does not remove the need to replace ageing infrastructure or maintain reliability. It makes the careful distinction between necessary maintenance, genuine improvement and unnecessary expansion more important than ever.
A natural evolution rather than a political programme
Localism is not a proposal to dismantle National Grid or replace national infrastructure with thousands of isolated systems.
It is the natural consequence of changing economic circumstances.
As the surplus energy supporting the industrial and consumer economies declines, the costs of maintaining their complexity become increasingly difficult to bear.
Households and businesses respond by reducing unnecessary expenditure, making greater use of local resources and concentrating more of their activity on essential needs.
Economic relationships become more local where this is practical and advantageous.
National infrastructure remains where its scale and function make it indispensable.
The resulting economic structure is not designed from above. It emerges through countless individual decisions made in response to changing circumstances.
Government and national institutions will still have important responsibilities, but they will increasingly have to recognise the financial limitations imposed by a shrinking economy.
The wider lesson
National Grid’s growing debt is not simply another example of corporate borrowing.
It reveals a deeper problem in the relationship between physical infrastructure, finance and the real economy.
The financial system continues to create obligations against future economic activity, while the energy foundations of that activity are becoming progressively more constrained.
Increasing debt can finance the construction of infrastructure. It cannot guarantee that the resulting infrastructure will remain affordable.
Nor can financial investment alone reverse the physical limitations associated with declining surplus energy.
National Grid’s difficulties therefore raise a question extending far beyond electricity.
How much of the infrastructure, financial debt and economic complexity inherited from the age of growth can Britain continue to support as its economy shrinks?
The answer will not be found simply by changing ownership, increasing borrowing or transferring costs between consumers and taxpayers.
It will emerge as the economy adjusts to the resources it can actually afford.
That adjustment is already taking place.
And it is one of the forces driving the natural evolution towards Localism.
Source: Jonathan Leake, “National Grid’s near-£50bn debt pile set to push up energy bills”, The Telegraph, 8 November 2026. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2026/11/08/national-grids-near-50bn-debt-pile-set-to-p
The growing influence of BRICS is usually discussed in terms of international politics, trade and the declining economic dominance of the Western world. But its significance may extend much further, eventually affecting the way ordinary people live, work and obtain the necessities of life.
BRICS began with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. It has since expanded to include other important countries, several possessing substantial energy and mineral resources. Together, they are challenging the international economic arrangements long dominated by the United States and its allies.
Their ambition is to increase trade between themselves, reduce dependence upon the US dollar and gain greater control over their economic affairs.
But there is a fundamental difficulty. BRICS is attempting to strengthen an industrial economic system whose capacity for continued growth is already under pressure.
The industrial world developed because abundant supplies of relatively inexpensive energy made it possible to produce and transport enormous quantities of goods.
As the Energy Cost of Energy (ECoE) increases, less surplus energy remains available to support economic activities beyond the provision of life’s necessities.
This is contributing to the shrinking economy, particularly through the increasing difficulty of sustaining discretionary consumption.
BRICS cannot escape this physical reality. China may manufacture consumer goods more cheaply than Britain, but its factories still require energy, materials and customers able to afford their products.
Changing the currency used in international trade does not change the energy required to manufacture and transport goods.
As BRICS becomes more influential, Britain may find itself facing greater competition for essential resources, particularly energy, minerals and manufactured goods.
Some international trading relationships will change. Britain’s financial influence may diminish, and the advantages previously enjoyed through Western dominance of international finance could weaken.
These developments may add to the pressures already affecting the British economy.
Higher costs for essential goods and services leave households with less money for discretionary purchases. Businesses supplying these purchases experience falling demand, with consequences for employment and investment.
Britain’s dependence upon imported goods and complex international supply chains makes it particularly vulnerable.
But these difficulties also create the circumstances in which Localism begins to develop.
The connection between BRICS and Localism is indirect but important.
BRICS is concerned with reorganising economic relationships between nations. Localism emerges when individuals and communities respond to changing economic circumstances.
As international trade becomes more expensive or less dependable, producing goods closer to where they are needed becomes increasingly attractive.
Local food production, repair services, building maintenance, timber production and other essential activities can gradually assume greater importance.
People losing employment in discretionary industries may find new opportunities in activities meeting local needs.
Land that can no longer be economically farmed through increasingly expensive industrial methods may become available for smaller-scale cultivation.
Families may increasingly depend upon their own productive activities and upon exchanges with neighbours rather than distant suppliers.
These developments do not require governments to introduce Localism as a policy. They arise naturally as economic circumstances change.
Nor does Localism mean the disappearance of national organisation. Railways, specialist hospitals, telecommunications and other essential services will continue to require wider cooperation.
The change is in the balance between local economic activity and dependence upon distant markets.
BRICS and Localism represent two very different responses to a changing world economy.
BRICS seeks to redistribute international economic power while continuing to pursue industrial growth.
Localism emerges as the shrinking economy encourages people to organise more of their everyday economic activities around essential needs and nearby resources.
The success of BRICS may determine which countries retain the greatest international influence. But it cannot remove the energy constraints affecting the industrial economy.
Indeed, the countries within BRICS may eventually experience their own movement towards more local economic arrangements.
The important point is that Localism does not depend upon which group of nations dominates world trade.
It arises from the changing physical and economic circumstances of human life.
BRICS may change who controls the global economy. Localism will change how people live as that economy shrinks.
And in the longer term, the second development may prove far more important than the first.
For some years, the suggestion that economic growth might be coming to an end has been treated as an eccentric opinion, outside the boundaries of conventional economics. Governments, economists, business leaders and most journalists have continued to assume that growth will eventually return, provided the right policies are adopted.
But something important is changing.
A growing number of respected thinkers are questioning the assumption that economic expansion can continue indefinitely. Some now argue that meaningful growth has already ended. Others believe that the physical and environmental limits to growth are approaching rapidly.
The distinction matters, but so does the direction of the debate.
The question is beginning to change from how can we restore growth? to what happens if growth cannot be restored?
That could become one of the most important changes in public thinking since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.
There are now several prominent examples.
Tim Morgan has been developing his Surplus Energy Economics model for more than a decade. His argument is that the economy is fundamentally an energy system, and that the rising energy cost of obtaining energy itself is progressively reducing the prosperity available to society.
In July 2026, Morgan concluded that the economy had stopped expanding in any meaningful sense and was heading into contraction. By October, he was discussing involuntary economic contraction as a development that humanity might have to manage rather than prevent.
Nate Hagens has been examining the relationship between energy, ecology, human behaviour and economic activity. His programme The Great Simplification has helped bring these questions to a much wider audience.
On 30 October 2026, Hagens published 7 Ways Growth Ends. He examined how the expansion of the economy could be brought to an end through interacting energy, ecological, financial and social pressures.
Hagens does not claim to have established an exact date for the end of global growth. Nevertheless, his increasingly explicit discussion of a future with less material abundance is significant.
Kate Raworth has approached the question from another direction. Her Doughnut Economics model argues that human wellbeing should be secured within the ecological limits of the planet, rather than making perpetual GDP growth the principal objective.
In June 2026, she discussed the end of endless growth in a BBC Radio 4 programme associated with Amol Rajan. This was particularly significant because the subject was being discussed through mainstream broadcasting rather than confined to specialist publications.
There are others.
In June 2026, six prominent economists and thinkers — Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas Piketty, Jayati Ghosh, Olivier De Schutter, Kate Raworth and Jason Hickel — jointly published an article in The Guardian arguing that economic growth was no longer an adequate strategy for overcoming poverty and inequality.
Their argument was not identical to Morgan’s. They were challenging growth as a political and social objective, rather than demonstrating that future growth was physically impossible.
Nevertheless, the significance of such prominent economists questioning the growth model should not be underestimated.
We should also remember earlier thinkers such as Herman Daly, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Donella Meadows, whose work laid much of the intellectual foundation for the present debate.
The important development is not that these ideas are new. It is that they are beginning to enter wider public discussion.
For decades, economic journalism has been built around a relatively simple assumption.
Growth is good. Recession is bad. When growth weakens, the task of government is to restore it.
Almost every discussion of taxation, investment, public spending, employment and living standards begins from that position.
But what happens when journalists themselves begin to doubt it?
There are already indications.
In February 2026, The Guardian published an extensive examination of whether economic growth could be reconciled with environmental limits. It explored post-growth economics as a serious alternative to conventional thinking.
The BBC’s discussion with Kate Raworth in June was another indication that the question was moving into mainstream broadcasting.
Yet there is a long way to go. A study published in June 2026 examined 389 articles from British and German publications and found that negative interpretations of degrowth had generally predominated. Mainstream journalism has certainly not accepted that growth is over.
The change may therefore begin with a few individual journalists rather than an entire newspaper.
My suspicion is that the breakthrough will come from an established financial or economic journalist who has spent years explaining why the British economy is struggling.
Such journalists encounter the contradictions almost every day.
Governments promise growth, yet public finances remain under pressure. Investment is encouraged, yet businesses struggle with energy costs. Productivity is supposed to improve, yet the benefits are difficult to identify in household living standards.
Infrastructure needs replacing, but the money is increasingly difficult to find.
Every problem is presented as something that can be solved by another policy, another investment programme or another technological breakthrough.
Eventually, a journalist may ask a different question.
What if these are not separate problems at all? What if they are consequences of the same underlying change — the ending of economic growth?
I would watch the established financial press particularly closely.
Journalists at the Financial Times, The Times and The Telegraph regularly examine debt, public expenditure, industrial decline, productivity and the difficulties facing British businesses.
They may not agree with the conclusions of surplus energy economics. But they are well placed to notice that conventional explanations are becoming less convincing.
The first decisive article may not declare that growth has ended.
It may simply ask whether Britain’s economic policies are based on an assumption that is no longer valid.
That question alone could change the debate.
There is an important distinction here.
Most conventional economists recognise that Britain has experienced a prolonged period of weak productivity and disappointing growth. They generally regard this as a problem that can be corrected.
The post-growth argument is fundamentally different.
It suggests that the material foundations of economic expansion are weakening. Rising energy costs, resource depletion, environmental damage and the growing cost of maintaining complex infrastructure may increasingly outweigh improvements in efficiency.
Under these conditions, additional borrowing and monetary expansion cannot necessarily create additional material prosperity.
This does not mean that every business will contract or that technological progress will cease. Some activities may continue to expand while others disappear.
Nor does it mean that official GDP figures must fall every year. Financial transactions and expenditure can increase even while the quantity of useful goods and services available to ordinary people diminishes.
The central question is whether society can continue increasing its material prosperity after meeting the rising costs of energy, resources and maintaining its existing systems.
Morgan believes that this turning point has already been reached.
Other economists disagree, and official forecasts still envisage some GDP growth.
But if Morgan is broadly correct, governments are not dealing with a temporary economic difficulty. They are dealing with the beginning of a different economic era.
No British government has been elected on a promise of permanent economic contraction.
Political programmes depend on the expectation that tomorrow’s economy will be larger than today’s.
Growth is expected to generate the additional tax revenues needed to finance pensions, healthcare, defence, education and the repayment of public debt.
Without growth, the political choices become much more difficult.
Additional expenditure in one area may require reductions elsewhere. Promises about future living standards become harder to fulfil. Infrastructure projects must compete directly with the maintenance of what already exists.
Perhaps most importantly, politicians would have to acknowledge that some of the economic expectations established during the Industrial Era can no longer be sustained.
That is an extraordinarily difficult admission.
It explains why governments may be among the last institutions to recognise what is happening.
Journalists, however, have no obligation to defend the assumptions upon which government policies are built.
Their responsibility is to question them.
If the British Government accepted that continuing material economic growth could no longer be relied upon, it would not have to abandon everything overnight.
But its priorities would need to change immediately.
The most immediate requirement would be a comprehensive review of government policy, asking which commitments depend upon future growth and which would remain viable without it.
Such a review would be uncomfortable. But it would be far less damaging than continuing to make promises that cannot be fulfilled.
This brings us to the most important consequence of all.
The ending of economic growth would not simply require different economic policies. It would gradually change the organisation of society.
The industrial economy has depended upon large organisations, long supply chains, centralised services, specialised employment and an extensive infrastructure supported by abundant energy.
As the resources available to maintain this complexity become more constrained, some activities will inevitably have to be organised differently.
This is where localism becomes important.
Localism is not simply a political preference for smaller government. It is a practical response to the changing physical and financial conditions under which society operates.
Food production, processing and distribution may become increasingly local. Small workshops may replace some distant manufacturing and repair services. Neighbours may provide forms of mutual assistance that formal organisations can no longer afford to supply.
Local economies may develop their own ways of exchanging goods, services and labour.
Some of these changes are already visible, although they are not yet sufficient to establish that a widespread shift towards localism is under way.
Nor should localism be mistaken for complete independence from national systems. Defence, strategic transport, communications and specialist healthcare will continue to require cooperation on a larger scale.
The important change is the direction of development.
Instead of assuming that ever larger organisations and increasingly complex systems must provide the future, we may begin to recognise the advantages of smaller, more adaptable local arrangements.
This would not necessarily be a programme imposed by government.
Much of it would emerge from the bottom up, as people and communities respond to changing circumstances.
Government’s most useful contribution might be to remove obstacles and enable this development rather than attempt to control every aspect of it.
There may come a moment when an influential journalist writes an article asking why, despite successive governments promising growth, Britain continues to struggle.
Instead of proposing another familiar solution, that journalist may question the underlying assumption.
Perhaps the economy is not waiting to recover.
Perhaps the conditions that supported two centuries of industrial expansion are disappearing.
Perhaps what we are witnessing is not another economic cycle but the beginning of a long-term change in the relationship between human society, energy and the natural world.
Once that possibility becomes an accepted subject of public discussion, the political debate will change.
The question will no longer be simply how to restore the economy we have known.
It will become how to organise a society that can function successfully without continuous economic expansion.
And that, I believe, is when localism will begin to be understood not as an eccentric alternative, but as an increasingly necessary part of our future.
The first journalist to ask whether growth has ended may do more to change Britain’s political thinking than another decade of promises to restore it.
Another Warning of the Fragility of the Industrial Economy
A remarkable series of cyberattacks across Europe has demonstrated just how vulnerable our modern food distribution system has become. Hackers have interfered with supermarket refrigeration systems, causing temperatures to rise dramatically and destroying stocks of fresh and frozen food.
According to a report in The Daily Telegraph on 2 November 2026, at least 70 supermarkets in Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Luxembourg and Estonia have been affected. The reported losses already exceed £88,000, and the full consequences may not yet be known.
In Belgium alone, 40 Delhaize supermarkets were affected, together with 15 Carrefour shops and five Spar stores. Thirteen SuperValu stores in Ireland were also targeted. Similar incidents have occurred in France and Sweden.
The attackers did not need to enter the supermarkets or physically damage their equipment. They apparently gained remote access to refrigeration control systems and changed their operating settings. In some cases, temperatures were reportedly set as high as 70°C.
In Sweden, one supermarket manager described hot air blowing into freezers while staff were unable to restore the correct temperatures.
The implications extend far beyond the loss of a few thousand pounds’ worth of food.
What we are witnessing is another example of the growing vulnerability of the highly interconnected industrial economy.
We Have Made Simple Things Unnecessarily Complicated
A refrigerator has a straightforward purpose. It keeps food cold.
Yet in the modern supermarket, this simple task may depend upon computers, software, electronic controllers, communications networks and remote management systems.
There are good reasons for some of these developments. Remote monitoring can reduce energy consumption, detect equipment failures and help maintain food safety.
But every additional connection creates another potential point of failure.
The refrigeration equipment may be perfectly serviceable. The electricity supply may be working normally. The supermarket may have sufficient staff and plenty of customers.
Nevertheless, somebody sitting at a computer hundreds or thousands of miles away may be able to render the entire refrigeration system useless.
This is an extraordinary situation.
We have created an economy in which increasingly sophisticated technology is required to perform functions that were once relatively simple.
The benefits are apparent when everything works. The disadvantages become obvious when something goes wrong.
The Vulnerability of Centralisation
The problem is not confined to refrigeration.
Modern supermarkets depend upon an enormous network of supporting systems. Their food supplies arrive through national and international distribution chains. Warehouses depend upon computerised stock control. Transport depends upon fuel, communications and increasingly sophisticated logistics.
Payments depend upon banking networks. Ordering depends upon electronic communications. Refrigeration depends upon electricity and computerised controls.
A failure in one part of this network can quickly affect many others.
The more closely interconnected these systems become, the greater the possibility that a relatively small disturbance will produce widespread consequences.
This is one of the weaknesses of centralisation.
Centralisation offers economies of scale, standardisation and administrative efficiency. But it also concentrates risk.
A single software vulnerability may affect hundreds of installations. A problem with one major distribution centre may interrupt supplies to dozens of towns. A communications failure may prevent otherwise functioning businesses from operating.
The industrial economy has become remarkably efficient at moving enormous quantities of goods over great distances.
It has become much less capable of functioning when its supporting systems are interrupted.
The Shrinking Economy Makes Matters Worse
There is another dimension to this problem which deserves attention.
The industrial economy is entering a period in which maintaining its enormous infrastructure is becoming increasingly difficult.
As the cost of energy, materials, maintenance and replacement rises relative to what society can afford, businesses and governments face difficult choices.
Equipment is kept in service longer. Maintenance may be postponed. Investment in replacement systems becomes harder to justify. Organisations seek to reduce staffing and operating costs.
Automation and remote management become attractive because they promise savings.
But these savings may come at the expense of resilience.
A supermarket chain might reduce its engineering staff by introducing centrally monitored refrigeration systems. Yet the resulting dependence upon software, communications and remote access may introduce vulnerabilities that are difficult and expensive to eliminate.
Cybersecurity itself requires continuing expenditure, specialist knowledge, software updates and technical support.
In a shrinking economy, the resources available for all these activities become increasingly constrained.
There is therefore a danger of a vicious circle.
Financial pressure encourages greater dependence upon automation and centralisation. Greater technological complexity creates additional vulnerabilities. Protecting against those vulnerabilities requires still more expenditure.
The apparent efficiency of the system conceals the growing cost of keeping it functioning.
Food Security Is About More Than Producing Food
Much discussion of food security concentrates upon agriculture.
Can Britain grow enough food? How much should we import? What happens if fertiliser becomes scarce or extreme weather damages harvests?
These are important questions.
But food security also depends upon what happens between the farm and the dinner table.
A country might produce sufficient food and still experience shortages if its distribution system breaks down.
The recent refrigeration attacks illustrate this distinction.
The food had already been grown, processed and delivered. It was sitting in supermarkets waiting to be purchased.
Yet it was lost because a computer-controlled refrigeration system was interfered with.
The food itself had not become scarce. The system required to preserve it had failed.
This distinction becomes increasingly important as the economy shrinks.
We may find that the principal problem is not always an absolute shortage of resources. It is the growing difficulty of maintaining the complex arrangements through which those resources are made available.
Localism Offers a Different Approach
Localism does not mean abandoning refrigeration, computers or modern technology.
It means reconsidering the scale at which essential activities are organised and reducing unnecessary dependence upon distant systems.
Consider a locality in which much of the food is grown, processed, stored and distributed nearby.
Vegetables might come from local gardens, smallholdings and market gardens. Bread might be produced by local bakeries. Meat, where available, might be supplied through local butchers and smaller processing facilities.
Food preservation could employ several methods rather than relying entirely upon industrial refrigeration.
Traditional techniques such as drying, bottling, fermentation, salting and cool storage could become more important.
Small cold stores might still be necessary, but they could be designed to operate independently, with local controls that do not require an internet connection.
Local electricity generation and storage might help maintain essential refrigeration during interruptions to the national supply.
None of these arrangements would eliminate risk. Local systems can fail too, and smaller facilities may lack the resources available to large organisations.
But the consequences of failure would be more contained.
A problem affecting one cold store would not necessarily affect every other cold store in the locality.
A communications failure would not prevent a local baker from selling bread.
A disruption to national distribution would be less serious where a substantial proportion of essential food was already produced nearby.
The objective would not be maximum efficiency measured solely in financial terms.
It would be sufficient efficiency combined with the ability to continue functioning when something goes wrong.
A Return to Simpler Technology
One of the most interesting consequences of a shrinking economy may be a renewed appreciation of simplicity.
For many years, technological progress has been associated with adding more functions, more automation and more connectivity.
But a more sophisticated system is not necessarily a better system.
A refrigerator that can be controlled remotely from another country may offer advantages to a large business. A refrigerator that continues operating reliably without any external communications may be more useful to a small locality.
The same principle applies to water supplies, heating, lighting, transport and many other essential services.
We should increasingly be asking whether a particular technology can be maintained locally, whether its components can be repaired, and whether it can continue operating independently of distant organisations.
This does not require rejecting innovation.
Indeed, designing simple, durable and repairable equipment may become one of the most important forms of innovation in the coming decades.
The objective should be technology that serves the community rather than making the community dependent upon technology it cannot control.
The Industrial Economy Is Losing Its Resilience
The supermarket refrigeration attacks are unlikely, by themselves, to change the direction of economic policy.
The immediate response will probably be demands for better cybersecurity, improved software and tighter controls over remote access.
These measures are necessary. They may prevent similar attacks and reduce losses.
But they do not address the larger question.
Why have we organised essential services in ways that allow relatively small technical failures to produce widespread disruption?
The answer lies partly in the priorities of the industrial era.
For generations, the emphasis has been upon expansion, economies of scale, specialisation, centralisation and financial efficiency.
These priorities made sense in an economy supported by abundant and relatively cheap energy, expanding markets and growing prosperity.
But the conditions are changing.
As the economy contracts, the ability to maintain increasingly complex infrastructure will come under pressure.
We cannot assume that every technical problem can be solved by adding another layer of technology.
Nor can we assume that the financial resources required to maintain these systems will always be available.
The attacks upon supermarket refrigeration systems are therefore more than isolated incidents of cybercrime.
They are reminders of the extent to which our everyday lives depend upon arrangements that most people neither see nor control.
The Coming Age of Localism
The emergence of localism will not be the result of a single government decision.
It is more likely to develop gradually as households, businesses and communities discover that some of their essential needs can be met more reliably through local arrangements.
Food is an obvious starting point.
As the industrial food system becomes more expensive and vulnerable, the advantages of local production, shorter distribution chains and simpler preservation methods will become increasingly apparent.
The same reasoning applies to water, energy, housing, health and many other essential activities.
National systems will continue to have important functions. But their role may increasingly become one of supporting local provision rather than attempting to organise every detail from the centre.
The future economy will need to be less dependent upon uninterrupted supplies of energy, sophisticated electronics and distant management.
It will need to be capable of operating at a smaller scale.
And it will need to place greater value upon resilience, repairability and independence.
The hackers who interfered with supermarket refrigerators across Europe have unintentionally provided a striking illustration of why this change is necessary.
When a distant computer can destroy the food in a local supermarket, perhaps it is time to reconsider how we organise the supply of something as essential as our daily bread.
The Question Nobody in Government Is Asking
Tim Watkins, writing in The Consciousness of Sheep on 2 November 2026, concludes his article A Matter of Taxonomy by raising what may be the most important economic question of our time.
In a world without economic growth, how should we allocate the remaining surplus energy and material resources?
It is a remarkable question because it challenges almost everything upon which modern economic and political thinking is based.
For more than two centuries, governments have assumed that economic growth would provide the means to improve living standards, finance public services, repay debts and support an expanding population.
Political arguments have largely concerned the distribution of the benefits of growth. The underlying assumption that growth would continue has seldom been questioned.
But what happens when growth ends? More importantly, what happens when the economy begins to shrink?
This is no longer simply a theoretical question. There is growing evidence that the economic arrangements developed during the industrial era are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. Yet governments continue to behave as though another period of economic expansion is just around the corner.
The Importance of Surplus Energy
Watkins identifies surplus energy as the foundation of economic activity. Energy is not simply another commodity which can be bought and sold. It is what enables everything else to happen.
Agriculture, manufacturing, transport, construction, healthcare and communications all depend upon energy. But what matters is not merely the amount of energy available. It is the energy remaining after we have obtained, processed and delivered that energy.
This surplus is what enables a society to support activities beyond the immediate necessities of survival.
During the industrial era, enormous quantities of relatively inexpensive fossil-fuel energy made possible an extraordinary expansion of economic activity. The result was a society characterised by increasing specialisation, centralisation, technological complexity and dependence upon long supply chains.
It also enabled the development of the welfare state, modern medicine, mass education and the enormous administrative structures of government.
But as the energy cost of obtaining energy increases, the surplus available to support these activities comes under pressure. The consequences are not necessarily immediate shortages of energy. They are more likely to appear initially as rising costs, declining affordability, falling profitability and the inability to maintain existing infrastructure.
The End of the Growth Economy
Our financial arrangements were developed for an expanding economy. Businesses borrow money in the expectation that future revenues will enable them to repay their debts. Governments borrow in the expectation that future economic activity will generate sufficient taxation to meet their obligations.
Households take on mortgages and other debts on the assumption that their incomes will remain adequate. All of these arrangements become increasingly difficult when the real economy ceases to expand.
A government may still report growth in monetary terms. But higher prices and increased borrowing do not necessarily mean that more useful goods and services are being produced. Indeed, the opposite may be happening.
A shrinking economy can continue to display increasing monetary transactions while delivering declining material prosperity. This distinction is fundamental.
The question is no longer simply how to generate more money. It is how to maintain essential activities with diminishing real resources.
The Problem of Allocation
This brings us back to Watkins’ final question. Who should decide how the remaining surplus energy and material resources are allocated?
At present, much of this allocation takes place through markets, prices, borrowing and government expenditure. Those with the greatest purchasing power can generally command the largest share of available resources. But purchasing power is not necessarily related to social usefulness.
Consider the difference between maintaining a local water supply and constructing another large entertainment complex. Or between providing basic healthcare and operating an energy-intensive financial trading system. Or between producing food locally and transporting discretionary consumer goods halfway around the world.
In an expanding economy, society may be able to support all these activities simultaneously. In a shrinking economy, choices become unavoidable. Some activities will have to contract so that others can continue.
This is the central political and economic challenge of the coming decades.
Why Central Government Cannot Provide the Whole Answer
Modern governments have become accustomed to managing economic activity through taxation, borrowing, regulation and public expenditure. These mechanisms can influence the distribution of money. They cannot create additional surplus energy or physical resources.
Nor can they readily determine the particular needs and capabilities of every locality. A government department in London cannot know, in sufficient detail, the available land, water, skills, workshops, buildings and practical requirements of thousands of different communities.
Even if it possessed this information, attempting to direct every activity centrally would create an enormous administrative burden.
There is also a deeper problem. Centralised systems themselves consume substantial resources. They require offices, communications networks, transport, specialist personnel, computer systems and increasingly expensive infrastructure.
As the economy shrinks, the cost of maintaining these systems becomes a growing burden upon the productive activities they are intended to support.
The question is therefore not simply how central government should distribute diminishing resources. It is whether some of the activities presently organised centrally should instead be undertaken locally.
Localism Provides Another Approach
Localism begins with a different question. Rather than asking how a national economy can continue expanding, it asks how people within a locality can provide for their essential needs using the resources available to them.
This changes the whole approach to economic organisation. Food production, water supplies, basic repairs, personal care, education and many other activities can be organised much closer to the people who depend upon them.
The advantages are not limited to shorter transport distances. Local knowledge becomes more important. Existing buildings and equipment can be reused. Skills can be shared. People can exchange services without every activity requiring a formal employer, employee or financial intermediary.
A retired carpenter may repair a neighbour’s furniture. A gardener may exchange vegetables for help maintaining a roof. A small workshop may repair equipment which would otherwise be discarded. A local bakery may supply nearby households using ingredients produced within the locality where practical.
These activities may contribute little to conventional measurements of economic growth. Nevertheless, they provide genuine economic value. Indeed, as the formal economy becomes less affordable, such activities may become increasingly important.
A Different Understanding of Work
Another important feature of Watkins’ article is his criticism of the conventional division between employers and employees. The modern economy contains many different arrangements.
There are employees, self-employed tradespeople, small business owners, part-time workers, people combining employment with benefits, and others undertaking informal work. As the industrial economy contracts, these distinctions may become even less useful.
We may see increasing numbers of people supporting themselves through several different activities rather than depending upon a single employer. Some may grow food, undertake repairs, provide care or exchange services. Others may establish small businesses operating from their homes.
This does not mean that conventional employment will disappear. It means that employment may cease to be the principal means by which every household obtains the goods and services it needs.
The informal economy could become an increasingly important part of everyday life. Such an evolution would also challenge the existing systems of taxation, benefits and economic measurement.
Governments may find themselves attempting to regulate an economy which is becoming progressively less dependent upon the institutions they understand.
Essential and Discretionary Activities
A shrinking economy will force a distinction between essential and discretionary activities. Food, water, shelter, sanitation, basic healthcare and essential communications must receive priority.
Many other activities, however desirable, will become increasingly difficult to support. This does not mean that all discretionary activities will disappear. Rather, their scale and complexity will be determined by what society can afford after essential needs have been met.
The distinction also helps us understand why localism is likely to emerge progressively rather than through a single political decision. As centrally organised services become unaffordable or unreliable, people will seek alternatives.
Some alternatives will be commercial. Others will be cooperative or informal. What matters is that the activity continues, even if the institutional arrangements surrounding it change.
The Two Levels of Economic Organisation
Localism does not require the disappearance of national government. Certain functions will remain national because their nature demands coordination over large distances or across many localities.
Defence, major rail connections, strategic healthcare, national communications and the administration of justice are examples. But many everyday requirements can be provided locally.
The challenge is to distinguish between activities which genuinely require national organisation and those which have become centralised simply because economic growth made centralisation affordable.
This distinction could become increasingly important as resources diminish. A smaller national economy would concentrate its remaining capacity upon essential functions which cannot sensibly be provided locally.
Localities would assume greater responsibility for everyday production, services and mutual support. This would not necessarily be the result of a planned political reform. It could emerge naturally as existing arrangements become too expensive to maintain.
The Political Problem
There is a fundamental difficulty facing today’s political leaders. They have been educated, trained and elected within a system which assumes that economic growth is both desirable and achievable.
Their policies are designed to encourage investment, increase productivity, expand employment and generate additional taxation. They have little experience of governing an economy which must operate with diminishing material resources.
Acknowledging this would require a profound change in political thinking. Instead of promising more of everything, governments would have to explain why some activities could no longer be supported.
Instead of encouraging consumption, they might have to encourage conservation, repair and reuse. Instead of concentrating economic activity in ever-larger organisations, they might have to facilitate smaller and more local arrangements.
Perhaps most difficult of all, they would have to accept that national government cannot solve every problem. For politicians accustomed to announcing national programmes and ambitious targets, this would be an uncomfortable admission.
Yet the alternative may be continued promises of growth accompanied by progressive deterioration in the services and infrastructure upon which people depend.
The Evolution Towards Localism
There is another way of understanding what is happening. The industrial economy developed because the conditions necessary to support it existed.
Abundant surplus energy enabled increasingly complex economic and social arrangements. As those conditions change, the arrangements themselves must change. This is not necessarily a matter of political ideology. It is a process of adaptation.
Just as living organisms adapt to changing environmental conditions, economic and social systems must adjust to changes in the resources available to sustain them.
Some institutions will survive. Others will become smaller, simpler or disappear. New forms of cooperation and production will emerge.
Localism can be understood as one possible outcome of this process. It offers a means of reducing dependence upon costly centralised systems while making better use of the resources and capabilities available within each locality.
It is not a guarantee of prosperity or an escape from the difficulties of economic contraction. But it may provide a more practical foundation for maintaining essential living standards than continued dependence upon growth which can no longer be assumed.
The Question That Really Matters
Tim Watkins ends his article by asking how society should allocate the surplus energy and material resources remaining to it. That is surely the right question.
But perhaps it needs to be taken one stage further. Rather than asking only who should allocate these resources, we should ask at what level should the decisions be made?
Some decisions must remain national. Many others could be made within the localities where people live, work and understand their own circumstances. This is the essential argument for localism.
The industrial era encouraged us to organise economic life from the top down because abundant energy made large, complex systems possible. A shrinking economy may increasingly favour arrangements which develop from the bottom up.
The political challenge is not to design every detail of this future. It is to recognise what is happening and remove unnecessary obstacles to people organising their own essential activities.
The most important question is no longer how we can restore economic growth. It is how we can organise society to live successfully without it.
And that may be the question which finally brings localism into the centre of political debate.
Inspired by Tim Watkins, “A Matter of Taxonomy”, The Consciousness of Sheep, 2 November 2026.
The railway disaster in Spain, in which 69 people were killed, raises questions that extend far beyond the immediate causes of the collision. It raises a much larger question about the ability of modern industrial societies to maintain the increasingly complex systems upon which they depend.
According to a report in The Daily Telegraph on 31 October 2026, the collision followed failures involving several railway systems. The main problem concerned the computerised safety system intended to prevent trains from colliding. There were also communication faults, electrical disturbances and failures in operating procedures.
An investigation is continuing, and the precise sequence of events and responsibilities has yet to be fully established. Nevertheless, the reported circumstances illustrate a problem that is becoming increasingly important.
Our infrastructure has become so complicated that maintaining its reliability may be approaching the limits of what we can afford.
Modern railways are very different from those of a century ago. Their operation depends upon computers, telecommunications, electrical equipment, sophisticated signalling systems and highly specialised maintenance.
Each element may be reliable in isolation. But the reliability of the whole system depends upon all the elements working together.
When one component fails, others are supposed to compensate. When several fail together, the consequences can become unpredictable.
The Spanish report suggests that the computerised train protection system had experienced 170 interruptions during the preceding year. The transport minister described this as normal.
That statement is revealing. A system may experience frequent faults and still operate safely, provided its protective arrangements work correctly. But it also raises the question of whether repeated interruptions are becoming accepted as an unavoidable feature of increasingly complicated infrastructure.
There is a further difficulty. When automated systems fail, human operators must sometimes take control. Yet those operators may have become accustomed to relying upon automation. The more sophisticated the equipment, the more difficult it can become to understand what is happening when something goes wrong.
Across Britain and much of Europe, a great deal of infrastructure was constructed during the period of industrial expansion following the Second World War.
Roads, bridges, railways, hospitals, water systems, electricity networks and public buildings are now reaching ages at which substantial renewal is required.
Maintenance is not the same as renewal. Repairing a component may extend its useful life, but eventually the entire installation may need replacing.
The financial consequences are enormous.
During the expanding industrial economy, new infrastructure could be financed from the expectation of rising prosperity, increasing tax revenues and growing demand.
That assumption is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
If the economy is entering a prolonged period of contraction, governments face a problem for which there is no easy solution. They must maintain an enormous inheritance of infrastructure while the resources available to support it become increasingly constrained.
And this is happening at precisely the time when much of that infrastructure requires expensive renewal.
There is another dimension which is often overlooked.
Every railway, computer, signalling installation and communications network depends upon energy.
Energy is required not only to operate equipment but also to manufacture replacement components, maintain the tracks, transport materials and support the industries that supply the railway.
The modern industrial economy was built upon the availability of abundant, relatively inexpensive energy.
As the energy cost of obtaining energy rises, the surplus available to support the wider economy comes under pressure.
This is central to the work of Dr Tim Morgan and his Surplus Energy Economics analysis.
It means that the financial cost of maintaining infrastructure is only part of the problem. Behind the financial figures lies the physical requirement for energy, materials and skilled labour.
Governments can borrow money. They cannot borrow physical energy from the future.
The Spanish railway disaster also illustrates the growing interdependence of modern systems.
A railway no longer depends simply upon rails, locomotives and signalling equipment. It depends upon a much wider industrial network.
Replacement electronic components may be manufactured thousands of miles away. Software requires specialist support. Telecommunications depend upon functioning electricity networks. Maintenance requires trained personnel and equipment supplied by other industries.
A failure elsewhere in this network can eventually affect the railway itself.
The same applies to hospitals, water supplies, banking, food distribution and telecommunications.
The greater the interdependence, the greater the possibility that a disturbance in one part of the economy will spread into others.
This does not mean that sophisticated technology is inherently unsafe. Properly maintained systems can be exceptionally reliable. The difficulty arises when the complexity of the system exceeds the resources, skills or organisational capacity available to maintain it.
For many years, governments have assumed that economic growth would provide the resources needed to maintain and expand public infrastructure.
That assumption underpins almost every long-term investment programme.
But what happens when the economy stops growing?
More importantly, what happens if it is already beginning to shrink in real terms?
The consequences are not necessarily immediate or dramatic.
Initially, maintenance may be postponed. Equipment may remain in service longer than intended. Staff numbers may be reduced. Inspections may become less frequent. Replacement programmes may be deferred.
Each decision may appear reasonable when considered separately.
Together, however, they can gradually reduce the resilience of the entire system.
This is particularly dangerous because deterioration may remain largely invisible until something goes wrong.
A bridge may appear sound. A signalling system may operate normally. A water main may continue supplying water.
Then a failure occurs, revealing weaknesses that have accumulated over many years.
The Spanish collision should not be attributed to economic contraction without evidence. But it provides a tragic reminder of what is at stake when safety-critical systems fail.
This may become one of the most important questions facing Britain.
We have inherited an industrial infrastructure constructed on the assumption that prosperity would continue to increase.
But maintaining that inheritance may require more resources than a shrinking economy can provide.
There will have to be choices.
Some infrastructure will remain essential at national level. The principal railway network, major hospitals, electricity transmission, strategic roads and national communications will still require central organisation.
But it may become impossible to maintain every existing facility to the standards established during the age of expansion.
The alternative is not simply to allow everything to deteriorate.
It is to reconsider how society is organised and how essential services are provided.
This is where localism becomes important.
Localism is not a proposal to replace national railway safety systems with local arrangements. Nor does it mean abandoning the benefits of modern engineering.
It means recognising that not every activity needs to depend upon an increasingly expensive national or international system.
A locality that produces more of its own food reduces its dependence upon long-distance transport.
A locality that can maintain its own water supply reduces its exposure to failures in distant infrastructure.
Local workshops capable of repairing equipment reduce dependence upon complicated international supply chains.
Local health and social care can reduce some of the pressures placed upon large central institutions.
And a locality in which more people work close to home reduces the need for extensive daily commuting.
These changes do not eliminate the need for national infrastructure. They reduce the extent to which everyday life depends upon it.
They also make it possible to organise some services using simpler systems that require fewer resources to operate and maintain.
During the industrial era, technological progress was frequently associated with greater sophistication and complexity.
But greater complexity is not always an advantage.
A simple system that can be understood, maintained and repaired locally may prove more valuable than a sophisticated system dependent upon distant specialists and components.
This does not mean returning indiscriminately to old technology.
It means judging technology by its usefulness, reliability, maintainability and demands upon scarce resources.
There is a distinction between technological sophistication and practical resilience.
A highly sophisticated system may be efficient when everything works correctly. A simpler system may be more resilient when conditions deteriorate.
The challenge is to find the appropriate balance.
The Spanish railway disaster is a tragedy. Its causes must be established through proper investigation, and the lessons applied to railway safety.
But it also invites us to consider a wider problem.
Modern industrial society has developed systems of extraordinary complexity. Those systems have delivered enormous benefits, but they require a continuing flow of energy, materials, money and specialist knowledge.
If those resources become increasingly constrained, maintaining the existing arrangements becomes progressively more difficult.
The response cannot simply be to demand more investment. Investment itself depends upon the availability of real resources.
Nor can we assume that another generation of computers and automated systems will necessarily solve the problem. New technology can improve safety and efficiency, but it can also introduce new dependencies and maintenance requirements.
We may be approaching a period in which the ability to simplify becomes as important as the ability to innovate.
This is one reason why localism is likely to emerge, not primarily as a political programme, but as a practical response to changing economic circumstances.
As large central systems become more difficult to maintain, people will increasingly have to find ways of providing essential services closer to home.
The process will be uneven. Some national systems will survive, others will contract, and new local arrangements will develop alongside them.
The industrial era taught us how to construct systems of extraordinary complexity. The coming age may require us to learn how to live successfully with much less complexity.
And that may prove to be one of the most important aspects of the evolution towards localism.
Based on the report “Four system failures led to Spain train crash, report finds”, by Lily Shanagher, The Daily Telegraph, 31 October 2026. The wider discussion of economic contraction, infrastructure and localism is an interpretation rather than a finding of the railway investigation.
For several years I have been writing about the end of economic growth and the emergence of localism. During much of that time, it has been a rather lonely occupation.
Almost everyone, from politicians and economists to business leaders and the media, has continued to assume that economic growth will return. Recessions are temporary. Financial difficulties can be overcome. New technology will create new prosperity. With the right policies, Britain can once again enjoy the rising living standards to which we have become accustomed.
I have increasingly come to believe that this entire way of thinking belongs to the past.
Economic growth has ended. What we are experiencing is not a temporary interruption to an expanding economy, but the early stages of a long period of economic contraction.
Now, importantly, I find that others are increasingly reaching similar conclusions.
Nate Hagens, whose work on energy, ecology and the economy I have followed with interest, has published a discussion entitled 7 Ways Growth Ends.
Hagens has long argued that our economic system is fundamentally dependent upon energy and natural resources. Money, financial markets and government policies cannot escape the physical limits of the world in which we live.
His work, particularly through The Great Simplification, examines the consequences of humanity’s dependence upon an economic system that requires continual expansion.
The significance of his latest contribution is not simply that growth might eventually end. It is that we must confront the mechanisms through which the growth-dependent system reaches its limits.
For me, this represents an important change in perspective.
We no longer need to ask only what might happen if growth ends. We need to examine what is already happening as the foundations of growth weaken.
The central misunderstanding of modern economics is its treatment of the economy primarily as a financial system.
Governments measure economic performance through GDP. They adjust interest rates, taxation and public expenditure in the hope of encouraging investment and consumption.
Yet none of these activities creates the energy or physical resources upon which economic activity ultimately depends.
The industrial economy developed because humanity discovered how to exploit enormous quantities of concentrated energy, particularly coal, oil and natural gas.
These energy sources allowed machines to replace human and animal labour. They supported the development of factories, mechanised agriculture, global transport, modern medicine and the enormous expansion of cities.
For more than two centuries, increasing access to usable energy supported an extraordinary expansion of economic activity.
But there is a fundamental difference between the availability of energy and the availability of surplus energy.
Energy must first be expended to obtain energy. As the cost of obtaining and delivering usable energy rises, less remains available to support the wider economy.
This is the importance of the Energy Cost of Energy, or ECoE, emphasised by Tim Morgan and others.
An economy can continue to produce and consume large quantities of energy while having progressively less surplus energy available to support prosperity.
That distinction is essential to understanding what is happening today.
We do not have to wait for an official announcement that the era of growth is over.
The consequences are increasingly visible in everyday life.
In Britain, public services are struggling with rising costs and competing demands. Local authorities face severe financial pressures. Roads, bridges, water systems, hospitals and other essential infrastructure require investment that is increasingly difficult to finance.
Businesses are finding it harder to remain profitable. Households face continuing pressure on their disposable incomes. Discretionary activities, including hospitality, leisure and non-essential retailing, are particularly vulnerable.
The labour market is changing. Established employment arrangements are becoming less secure, while opportunities for small-scale, informal and self-employed activity may become more important.
Meanwhile, governments continue borrowing in the expectation that future economic growth will make today’s financial commitments affordable.
These developments do not individually prove that growth has permanently ended. But taken together, they are consistent with an economy encountering increasingly severe physical and financial constraints.
The mistake is to treat each problem as an isolated difficulty requiring its own solution.
I believe they are different expressions of the same underlying change.
Political leaders continue to promise renewed economic growth.
They propose investment in infrastructure, new factories, artificial intelligence, renewable energy and other technologies.
Some of these developments will undoubtedly provide useful benefits. But technological progress does not automatically produce greater prosperity across the economy.
Every new factory requires materials and energy. Every data centre needs electricity, cooling and maintenance. Every new transport system must be built, operated and eventually replaced.
The question is not whether these activities are technically possible.
It is whether society can afford the resources required to sustain them.
An economy experiencing declining surplus energy cannot necessarily restore prosperity by constructing more energy-intensive infrastructure.
Nor can borrowing indefinitely overcome physical limitations.
Financial promises are claims upon future production. If that production cannot expand as expected, the promises become increasingly difficult to honour.
The result is growing pressure upon governments, businesses and households alike.
This is not a problem that can be resolved simply by electing a different government or changing economic policy.
It is a change in the physical conditions upon which the industrial economy was built.
Once we accept that the economy is contracting, many of our assumptions about the future must change.
We can no longer assume that governments will have steadily increasing tax revenues. We cannot assume that all existing infrastructure can be maintained indefinitely. We cannot assume that every public service can continue to be delivered through increasingly large and centralised organisations.
Nor can we assume that the employment patterns of the industrial era will survive unchanged.
The implications extend far beyond economics.
They affect where people live, how food is produced, how water is supplied, how people travel, how communities organise themselves and how essential services are provided.
Above all, they challenge the belief that bigger organisations, larger markets and greater centralisation necessarily represent progress.
In a contracting economy, the opposite may increasingly be true.
This is where my argument about localism becomes particularly important.
For years, localism has generally been discussed as a desirable alternative to excessive centralisation. I believe it is becoming something much more fundamental.
Localism is emerging as a practical response to the declining affordability of the industrial economy.
As centralised systems become increasingly expensive to maintain, people will have to find ways of meeting more of their essential needs closer to home.
Food production provides an obvious example.
The existing food system depends upon extensive transport networks, industrial agriculture, chemical fertilisers, refrigeration, packaging and large retail organisations.
It is remarkably productive, but also dependent upon energy, capital and complex supply chains.
As those systems come under increasing pressure, local food production becomes more important.
Gardens, allotments, smallholdings, orchards, local bakeries and small food-processing businesses can contribute to a more resilient food supply.
Similar changes can occur in other activities.
Small workshops can undertake repairs that would otherwise require expensive replacements. Local arrangements can provide some care and practical assistance. Informal exchanges of goods and services can supplement declining monetary incomes.
These activities will not replace the entire industrial economy. National systems will remain essential for defence, major transport links, specialised healthcare and other functions.
But the balance between national and local provision is likely to change substantially.
Instead of expecting centralised organisations to provide almost everything, localities will increasingly have to provide more for themselves.
This is not a romantic return to the past.
It is an economic response to changing circumstances.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to preparing for this future is our continued attachment to the expectation of growth.
Governments are elected on promises of greater prosperity. Businesses borrow and invest on the assumption of expanding markets. Pension systems depend upon future income and investment returns. Property values reflect expectations about future purchasing power.
The entire financial structure of modern society has been built around expansion.
Acknowledging that this expansion has ended is therefore profoundly uncomfortable.
It challenges political promises, business plans, financial expectations and personal ambitions.
It is much easier to believe that another technological breakthrough or another economic policy will restore the familiar pattern.
But delaying recognition does not prevent the consequences.
Indeed, it may make them worse.
If governments continue investing scarce resources in infrastructure designed for an expanding economy, they risk creating further financial burdens that future generations will struggle to support.
If communities continue waiting for national solutions, they may lose valuable opportunities to develop their own capabilities.
The sooner we recognise the change, the more opportunities we have to respond constructively.
I began by saying that writing about the end of growth has sometimes been a lonely occupation.
That has been particularly true because the argument is so different from the assumptions that dominate public discussion.
When almost everyone expects growth to resume, suggesting that the industrial era has reached its limits can appear unnecessarily pessimistic.
But pessimism is not the same as realism.
I do not welcome economic contraction. It will create serious difficulties, particularly for people who already have little financial security.
Nor do I imagine that localism will emerge without hardship, conflict or mistakes.
My argument is simply that we must begin with an understanding of the circumstances we actually face.
The growing contribution of thinkers such as Nate Hagens, Tim Morgan and others is important because it helps establish a different understanding of the economy.
Their analyses are not identical, and they do not all claim that permanent global economic contraction has already been demonstrated. But they share a recognition that energy, ecology and physical resources place fundamental limits upon economic expansion.
Hagens has recently described a possible future of resource-constrained economic depression, while exploring what evidence might change his assessment. natehagens.substack.com+1
For me, the evidence has become sufficiently compelling to change the question I ask.
I am no longer asking whether economic growth might end.
I am asking how society will reorganise itself now that the growth-dependent industrial economy is encountering its limits.
History rarely announces the beginning of a new era.
The changes usually become apparent gradually, through the failure of old arrangements and the emergence of new ones.
The industrial era did not begin on a particular day. Nor will its ending be marked by a single announcement.
Factories will continue operating. International trade will continue. Governments will continue promising growth. New technologies will continue appearing.
But beneath these familiar activities, the economic foundations are changing.
Increasingly, the question will not be how to expand an existing system, but how to maintain essential functions with fewer resources.
That is a very different challenge.
It calls for smaller organisations, simpler arrangements, greater cooperation and a renewed importance for the locality.
It also calls for a different understanding of prosperity.
Prosperity in the future may depend less upon the quantity of goods and services we consume and more upon our ability to meet essential needs reliably, affordably and close to home.
A productive garden, a functioning local workshop, a dependable water supply and neighbours willing to help one another may become more valuable than many of the activities currently counted as economic progress.
This is the future towards which I believe we are already moving.
The task is no longer simply to warn that the era of growth may be coming to an end.
It is to recognise that the change is under way, understand its consequences and begin building the local arrangements that will enable us to live within the resources available to us.
For me, that is what localism has always been about.
And I am increasingly encouraged that I am no longer alone in recognising the direction in which we are heading.
An interesting development in British energy technology has emerged which could have considerable implications for the future of localism.
According to an article in The Daily Telegraph on 27 October 2026, a young British company, Rivan Industries, believes it has developed a means of producing synthetic natural gas more cheaply than Britain can import conventional gas.
The company’s founder, Harvey Hodd, claims that its technology could eventually produce gas at prices below anything Britain has experienced in recent decades.
This is an extraordinary claim. If it proves correct, it could have important consequences for the future of Britain’s energy supplies. But perhaps the most interesting aspect is not simply the possibility of cheaper gas. It is the way in which that gas would be produced.
Instead of relying upon enormous centralised installations, imported fossil fuels and international supply chains, Rivan proposes relatively small manufacturing units powered by locally generated solar electricity.
That immediately raises an interesting question. Could this technology become part of the emerging localism economy?
The principle is surprisingly straightforward, although the engineering involved is sophisticated.
Rivan’s system uses three principal ingredients: electricity generated by solar panels, water collected from rainfall, and carbon dioxide extracted from the atmosphere.
Electricity is used to separate water into hydrogen and oxygen. The hydrogen is then combined with carbon dioxide in a chemical reactor to produce synthetic methane, the principal constituent of natural gas.
When this methane is subsequently burned, it releases the carbon dioxide that was originally extracted from the atmosphere.
Provided that the electricity and other processes involved have sufficiently low emissions, the resulting gas could have a very low net carbon footprint.
There is another considerable advantage. Synthetic methane can potentially be used in much of the existing natural gas infrastructure.
Gas boilers, industrial furnaces, gas-fired power stations and other equipment could continue operating without the wholesale replacement that would be required by some alternative energy systems.
In a shrinking economy, where the capital available for replacing infrastructure is likely to become increasingly scarce, that could be particularly important.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of Rivan’s approach is the relatively small size of its production units.
The company describes plants roughly the size of shipping containers, situated alongside solar installations.
This is quite different from the conventional energy industry, which has generally favoured large generating stations, refineries, pipelines and national distribution networks.
The possibility of producing gas in relatively small installations introduces an entirely different way of thinking.
Imagine a locality with its own solar electricity generation, rainwater collection and a small synthetic gas production plant.
Such an installation might provide fuel for essential local activities, including food processing, workshops, communal kitchens and other services requiring reliable heat.
Some of the gas might be stored for periods when solar electricity is unavailable.
Rather than depending entirely upon distant energy suppliers, the locality could meet part of its own energy requirements.
This would not necessarily mean complete energy independence. But it could mean considerably greater resilience.
And resilience is likely to become increasingly important as the national economy continues to contract.
One of the principal weaknesses of solar electricity is that it is intermittent.
Electricity is produced during daylight hours, and production varies enormously with the weather and the seasons.
Batteries provide one means of storing electricity, but their manufacture requires considerable quantities of materials, industrial processing and capital.
Synthetic methane offers another possibility.
Surplus solar electricity could be converted into gas and stored for subsequent use.
Gas is particularly useful because it can provide heat directly, without first having to be converted back into electricity.
It could also be used to generate electricity when necessary, although that involves further energy losses.
For localism, the possibility of storing energy over longer periods could be valuable. A locality might accumulate gas during periods of abundant sunshine and use it when conditions are less favourable.
There is, however, an important qualification. Converting electricity into hydrogen and then methane involves substantial energy losses. Directly using solar electricity will generally be more efficient.
The attraction of synthetic gas is therefore not that it creates additional energy, but that it provides a potentially useful way of storing and transporting energy which would otherwise be difficult to use.
There is a fundamental question which must not be overlooked.
My argument for the emergence of localism rests on the declining availability of surplus energy to support the industrial economy’s complexity.
Producing synthetic methane does not overcome the laws of thermodynamics.
Every stage of the process consumes energy. Manufacturing the solar panels, electrolysers, reactors, compressors and other equipment also requires materials, energy and industrial infrastructure.
The critical question is therefore not simply how cheaply the gas can be sold.
It is how much useful energy remains after accounting for the energy required to manufacture, operate and maintain the entire system.
In other words, what is its Energy Cost of Energy?
Cheap solar electricity could make synthetic methane commercially attractive. But cheap electricity does not automatically mean a high surplus-energy return.
Rivan’s claims are promising, but they remain to be demonstrated at commercial scale. The company’s proposed prices, production rates and profitability are projections rather than established achievements.
This distinction matters greatly.
A technology can be financially successful while remaining dependent upon a large and complex industrial economy for its manufacture and maintenance.
This brings us to what may be the most important implication for localism.
I have argued that the future economy is likely to consist of two increasingly distinct parts.
The first will be a much reduced national economy, retaining those essential activities which cannot readily be undertaken locally.
The second will be a growing local economy, providing food, water, housing, maintenance, care and other necessities from resources available within each locality.
Synthetic gas production might provide a useful connection between these two economies.
Initially, the equipment would almost certainly have to be manufactured by specialist national industries. Its components would depend upon sophisticated engineering, electronics and chemical processing.
But the resulting installations might be operated at a much more local level.
A locality would not need to manufacture every component itself to benefit from having a local energy supply.
This is an important distinction.
Localism does not necessarily mean that every locality must become completely self-sufficient. It means that essential activities should increasingly be organised and provided at the smallest practical scale.
A small synthetic gas installation could fit that principle, provided its operation, maintenance and eventual replacement remained affordable.
One particularly interesting possibility concerns food.
In a shrinking economy, maintaining food production and distribution will become an increasingly important priority.
Local bakeries, dairies, small food-processing workshops and communal kitchens all require heat.
Gas is especially convenient for many of these activities because it can provide controllable heat using relatively simple equipment.
Synthetic methane might therefore become a useful local fuel, particularly where direct electricity, wood or other locally available fuels are unsuitable.
There could also be applications in drying agricultural produce, preserving food and providing limited heating for essential buildings.
However, producing synthetic gas would require a substantial supply of electricity. It would be unlikely to make sense to use scarce solar electricity to manufacture gas where that electricity could perform the same task directly.
Localities would need to establish priorities.
The first priority should always be to reduce unnecessary energy consumption. The second should be to use available energy as efficiently as possible.
Synthetic gas might then provide a valuable supplementary resource.
There is another difficulty which is particularly relevant to Britain.
Solar electricity production is greatest during the summer, whereas demand for heating is greatest during the winter.
A locality relying upon solar-powered synthetic methane would therefore face the problem of producing enough gas during the warmer months to meet at least some of its winter requirements.
That would require substantial storage facilities.
Although methane is easier to store than hydrogen in some respects, storing large quantities of gas is neither simple nor inexpensive.
Small installations would also need suitable land, water supplies, maintenance arrangements and trained operators.
The technology might consequently be better suited to groups of neighbouring localities than to individual villages.
Co-operation between localities could provide some of the advantages of scale without recreating the entire complexity of today’s centralised energy system.
Rivan’s immediate ambition is to supply industrial customers and feed synthetic gas into the existing national network.
That may prove commercially attractive, particularly for industries that cannot readily replace gas with electricity.
But replacing Britain’s entire natural gas supply would be an altogether different undertaking.
The quantity of electricity required would be enormous, because the synthetic gas contains less useful energy than the electricity consumed in producing it.
There would also be substantial requirements for solar installations, equipment, land and capital.
It would therefore be premature to imagine that synthetic gas could preserve Britain’s existing levels of energy consumption indefinitely.
Indeed, that is not the objective of localism.
The emerging local economy will need to operate with considerably less energy than today’s industrial economy. It will depend upon simpler activities, shorter supply chains, more human labour and greater use of resources available locally.
The real question is whether synthetic gas could help provide a modest but reliable supply of fuel for those essential activities that cannot easily dispense with it.
There is a tendency whenever a promising energy technology appears to regard it as a possible rescue for the existing economic system.
We have seen this with nuclear fusion, hydrogen, advanced batteries and many other developments.
Each is presented as a means of continuing economic growth without fundamentally changing how society operates.
But the central problem is not simply finding new ways of producing energy.
It is the growing difficulty of maintaining an economy whose infrastructure, institutions and consumption patterns require enormous quantities of affordable surplus energy.
Synthetic methane does not remove that difficulty.
Nevertheless, Rivan’s approach is interesting precisely because its proposed production units are relatively small and potentially decentralised.
If the technology proves economical, durable and capable of operating with modest maintenance requirements, it might become one of the useful tools available to the emerging local economy.
It could be especially valuable during the period when national industrial capacity remains sufficient to manufacture the equipment, but localities are increasingly taking responsibility for their own essential services.
The most significant aspect of this development may not be the prospect of producing the cheapest gas on Earth.
It may be the possibility of producing useful fuel close to where it is needed, using locally available renewable energy, water and atmospheric carbon dioxide.
That is a fundamentally different proposition from importing fossil fuels across oceans and distributing them through an enormously complex international system.
But there is a condition.
The technology must be judged not merely by its commercial profitability, but by its contribution to the long-term ability of localities to support themselves.
Can the equipment be maintained locally? How long will it last? Can replacement components remain available? Does it provide sufficient surplus energy to justify the resources invested in it?
And, above all, can it continue to operate as the wider industrial economy becomes smaller?
These are the questions that matter.
Localism will not emerge because some remarkable new technology makes the old economy sustainable. It will emerge because people increasingly need to provide their essential requirements closer to home.
If Rivan Industries succeeds, its technology could make a useful contribution to that process.
Not by preserving the energy-intensive way of life to which we have become accustomed, but by helping smaller, more self-reliant localities meet some of their essential energy needs.
That would be a much more significant achievement than simply making cheap gas.
| The Honest Sorcerer Oct 2 |

An article published on un-denial got me thinking about the feedback mechanisms which could push global civilization towards a rapidly accelerating simplification. Not because some evil / stupid / fill-in-the-blank people started a war, but because all technological civilizations are inherently unsustainable, and because they must come to an end no matter what.
The manufacturing, use and decommissioning of all our modern technologies require abundant mineral and energy flows. Non-renewable resources are at the core of every product and service we use: from all the metal and plastic parts in your car to the very screen you are reading this essay on. Powering these devices with fossil fuels or “renewables” is but a secondary question to the core of our technological and ecological predicament: the impossibility of maintaining a high-tech industrial civilization on a dwindling resource and ecological base.
Naysayers, of course, treat this as “Malthusian” thinking, as if slapping a label on an idea could automatically negate it. The hand-waving over resource depletion and treating it as a mere technical issue is, however, nothing but a form of denial. See, in order to dismiss the uncomfortable truth of our civilization’s predicament one has to reject a number of well established and proven trends:
A recent study on Critical minerals and the energy transition is a case in point. It comes very close to prove the core thesis of the civilizational predicament, then botches it by setting the input parameters absurdly high and the tolerable level of energy return on investment absurdly low… Disregarding, all the time, the very strong practical connection between fossil fuels and mining—together with the already failing economics of both metals and fossil fuel extraction; not to mention the ecological damage civilization does to this living planet. Despite providing an excellent analysis on recycling, rising energy investment and complexity, the authors fail to properly implement these trends in their models. Well-well, by focusing on theoretical maximum values and not considering the practical realities of resource extraction, one can create all the models they want, yet could still fall short of providing a practical guide to the future.grade to paid
Let’s start with recycling, my favorite thought-stopper when it comes to dealing with the existential dread techno-utopians feel over having to return to a much lower level of technology use in the future. Because let’s face it: when it comes to high emotions and the money involved in proving that we can have our cake and eat it too, we often have to deal with a deep underlying emotion: fear. It’s not unlike becoming aware of our mortality and the mind over reality transition every one of us is subject to (yours truly included). It’s not hard to see why it’s impossible to preach endless technological progress, together with the increases in human well-being it ostensibly brings about, and coming to grips with the reality of technological development being self-terminating by necessity.
Psychological factors aside, let’s return to recycling and its role in civilization’s self-termination. (I know it’s a harsh word, but it is what it is.) The core theme to understand here is that recycling materials is not—and can never be—perfect: metals are often mixed with other metals in alloys, or exist in such small quantities deeply-buried in complex assemblies that reclaiming them would be totally uneconomical. Think of all the germanium trapped in the silicon wafers of chips, hair-thin copper wiring sheathed in thick plastic, tiny coils, resistors, capacitors, or the metals thrown out with the many too-cheap-to-bother household appliances from defunct hair dryers to broken food processors and toasters.
As someone who worked two decades in and around manufacturing, supply chains and product development I can testify: products are not designed, built and made with 100% recycling in mind in any company around the world. Much of the metals—rare or common—thus end up on a scrap-heap or get melted down into a very low quality alloy used in making steel rebar. Has the material been recycled by weight? Sure, but did we got the copper, cobalt, nickel etc. back? No, these valuable metals are now lost forever, mixed irretrievably with a range of other metals and buried deep into concrete. Relying on recycling alone would thus rapidly deplete the pile of reclaimable materials, and after a few rounds would see us materially bankrupt.
Mineral extraction and primary metal production, therefore, cannot stop. In fact, it has to constantly increase in scale even as mining companies are forced to fight an uphill battle with depletion—necessitating the deployment of ever more complex and energy hungry methods and technologies. For a visual illustration compare an artisan copper mine a few centuries ago (or a present day cobalt mine in Congo) where people collect high grade, high metal content rocks (ores) using a pickax and a basket, and a modern day open pit mine where massive trucks haul hundreds of tons of dirt containing less than 0.5% metal. Yes, it is not a typo: modern mining operations blast, dig, haul and crush rocks containing a pound of pure metal per a ton of dirt.
There is no way you can do this without massively increasing the material, technological and energy investment compared to a much simpler operation. Sure, this constant rise in complexity brings with it the creation of new jobs and skills, but also the need to use more complex, bigger, heavier machinery and computer systems to monitor and coordinate these activities (now assisted with AI). All of which is contributing to an ever higher energy consumption. Problem is, that mined ore grades (expressed in % of metal content) degrade over time, as we harvest all the high quality stuff first and are forced to move on to the next, lower grade batch. And as ore grades decrease, the energy, emissions and water intensity required to obtain that same dumb pound of metal will continue to grow. As Calvo et al. found in 2016:
“Analyzing only copper mines, the average ore grade has decreased approximately by 25% in just ten years. In that same period, the total energy consumption has increased at a higher rate than production (46% energy increase over 30% production increase).”
Oh, and by the way, the same is true to recycling as well: just as declining ore grades raise the energy demand of the primary production of metals, so does the energy demand of secondary production increase as the end of life recycling rate gets higher. In essence once we want to recycle anything else than the easy stuff—scraps from the shopfloor or pure copper wires as thick as your arm—we will have to go further and exert more energy to reclaim the metals we now simply throw away. As I alluded to above and as another study on the subject found: “Our empirical analysis of 48 metals shows that their recycling is mainly impeded by their low concentrations. In many cases, the metal concentration in end-of-life products is lower than that in natural ores.” Put in plain English: it’s much easier (and cheaper) to dig up low-grade dirt, than to collect, separate then recycle much of the metal in use out there. No wonder, the authors conclude: “The energy requirements for recycling copper from end-of-life products already reach the magnitude of those for primary production.” I have to put an emphasis on the word: already.

The process of falling metal concentration—both in mines and scrap-heaps—and the subsequent rise in complexity and energy demand per ton of metal processed gets reflected in prices as well. ‘Then rising prices will solve the issue’—comes the usual retort. And sure enough, so far they did—but there is a catch. Without an ever growing demand for these metals, high prices—needed to maintain production—would simply collapse, and see many mining operations going bankrupt. Rising complexity requires a forever-growing market to support the increasing cost of designing, manufacturing and operating new mining and recycling technologies. A growing market, on the other hand, requires a healthy, growing economy able to invest in new technologies (“renewables,” electrification, AI etc.) not to mention a strong (and growing) consumer base able to pay for it all.
It all looks good on paper, but what happens when the “consumer base” (a.k.a. the population) stops growing, begins to age, get impoverished by high energy prices, taxes and mortgages, or laid off?
Or what happens when the next round of innovation would require more resources and more energy than what the current system could physically provide? (Ahem, AI, anyone? Or how about mining in space? Fusion, perhaps?)
Or what happens when mining and drilling companies run out of “prime acreage”—where returns are high enough to justify investment—and what remains of our “infinite” resource base turns out to be wholly uneconomic to get? (Sure, 0.0068% of Earth’s crust is copper, but who in their right mind thinks that’s economic to go after?)
Or what happens when all those prior investments in technology, high living standards, stock market bubbles etc. can no longer be financed as interest rates rise and incomes dwindle?
Or what happens when wars begin to actively reduce energy and material flows worldwide?
Or what happens when global oil production—still powering 99% of all mining, agriculture, construction, militaries and transportation to this very day—stops growing due to all these reasons above and when the net energy derived of oil begins to fall?
Or, last but not least, what happens when all of these arrive at once?
Maintaining modernity requires constant growth. Not just from a financial standpoint, but from a purely technological perspective. Without an ever growing demand for raw materials, extraction collapses under the weight and cost of its rising complexity—not to mention the rising interest payments on debts taken on to finance it all. Modernity in general, and not just oil and gas, has become a giant Ponzi scheme—a bubble of truly epic proportions. Should it stop growing, it would immediately begin to contract—collapsing at a much faster rate than what it took for it to grow.
“Steady state” is mathematically impossible in such a system: technological civilizations either grow or shrink rapidly. As their highly concentrated, easy-to-get mineral and natural resources deplete, and as their industries need to adopt ever more sophisticated ways to go after lower and lower grade sources, complexity and energy consumption begins to rise faster than the amount of raw material and energy returned to society. And since energy production is a function of material output (either directly such as coal, or indirectly via “renewables”¹), there is less and less surplus left for the rest of society to share. Wealth and power begins to concentrate as a result, and the average citizen gets materially poorer by the day. This socioeconomic feedback loop then begins to erode demand through lower birth rates and falling disposable income. Falling demand and an exponential rise in energy and material costs then makes further material expansion impossible, till contraction sets in and demand is completely destroyed in a self-reinforcing feedback loop.
This won’t happen overnight though. Scarcity, resulting from the first round of production collapse, would begin to raise prices again, stopping the cascade before it could become complete. The weakest players break, then the “equilibrium” is restored. A round of consolidation follows: assets are bought up and production restarts, but cannot be restored completely as the market can no longer support it. Buffers and resilience suffer a blow, and never get restored. Jobs are lost forever. Consumer sentiment and spending get a hit. Demand begins to quietly decline, again.
‘But, but, but… What about financial stimulus?’ Can new money restore demand? I’m afraid not. Given the fact that most oil and metal production now comes from mines past their peak, and new projects are few and far between, stimulus would only lead to higher inflation. Which would then be used by mining and drilling companies to pay back their debt, buy back some of their own stocks, pay higher dividends or to merge with one-another. New exploration, however, would not commence as the number (and quality) of potential drilling sites, where returns would be reasonably high, is falling like a rock—for decades now. The US shale oil business is a case in point.
As a result of persistent resource depletion, wars and economic decline, annual metal and oil output is much more likely to fall, than to increase over the years and decades ahead. The resulting scarcity will then further erode buffers and resiliency, till enough bricks are knocked out to start another round of collapse. This time, though, the lack of raw materials and energy will likely trigger a cascade of company failures across multiple supply chains. You know the story: “For want of a nail, the shoe was lost. For want of a shoe, the horse was lost…” And so on, and so forth. Then, as enough productive capacity is destroyed, a new “equilibrium” sets in, again. Buffers and resilience suffer another blow, and never get restored. More jobs are lost forever. Consumer sentiment and spending gets another hit. Demand continues to fall without a sound. Rinse and repeat.
Years and decades into this process six continent supply chains begin to fragment into smaller, more manageable chunks. Products get localized. World trade diminishes. Demand for fuel and raw materials continue their long decline. Technological and societal simplification accelerates. Roles which were added on the way up are now erased. And just as the Romans towards the end of their civilization could not believe what’s happening to their mighty empire, the top scientific and political elite will continue to pin their hopes on the next big, shiny and new innovation ahead—not realizing that we’ve already entered the self-reinforcing loop of the great simplification.
Viewed from a distance, say two hundred years from now, the end of modernity will look like a fabled supernova explosion: one day it worked, the other day it all fell into ruins. On the ground, here and now, however, this all looks like a series of never ending crises: a global health crisis in one year, a war in the next—all against the backdrop of a relentless economic and ecological decline. On and on, for decades—just like in Rome. ‘But hey, this time it’s different!’ No it’s not. Not at all. ‘Is this the end of the world then?’ No, its the beginning of a new era, marking the onset of the de-industrial revolution.
What KasiNomics Reveals About Localism and the Shrinking Economy
While economists, governments and financial institutions concentrate upon GDP, employment figures, investment and economic growth, another kind of economy is developing beneath the surface.
In South Africa, it is already enormous.
In his book KasiNomics Unleashed, GG Alcock describes a world of small traders, household businesses, food producers, repairers, transport operators and countless other enterprises operating outside much of the conventional corporate economy.
These businesses are not generally the products of government economic development programmes. They have emerged because people need to earn a living, obtain essential goods and provide services which conventional businesses often fail to supply.
What makes Alcock’s account particularly interesting is that it describes an economy developing from the bottom upwards.
This is remarkably close to the process which will become increasingly important as the British economy begins to shrink.
There is, however, a fundamental difference. Alcock sees the informal economy as an enormous opportunity for growth. I see similar developments as a likely consequence of the end of sustained economic growth.
The same economic behaviour may therefore arise for quite different reasons.
For generations, economic development has been associated with the movement of people into formal employment.
People left the land, abandoned household production and entered factories, offices, shops and large organisations. Their livelihoods became increasingly dependent upon employers, wages and the wider monetary economy.
The process was made possible by abundant energy, industrialisation, mechanisation and increasingly complex systems of production and distribution.
It also created enormous dependence.
Most households in Britain today produce very little of what they consume. Food, clothing, heating, transport and almost every other necessity depend upon an elaborate network of businesses, infrastructure and public services.
Employment provides the money required to purchase these essentials.
But what happens when conventional employment becomes less available?
South Africa offers one possible answer.
People do not necessarily remain economically inactive. They find other ways of earning money, producing goods and exchanging services.
A person may repair machinery, prepare food, sell vegetables, transport goods or undertake building work without becoming an employee of a conventional business.
Some activities are registered and taxed. Others are informal or only partially recorded.
The distinction between employment and economic activity becomes increasingly important.
An economy can contain a great deal of useful work which is not adequately represented by conventional measures of employment and business activity.
Alcock describes an extraordinary variety of small enterprises.
Many require little capital. They operate from homes, backyards, roadside premises or small workshops. They serve customers who live nearby and whose requirements they understand.
Their strength lies in simplicity, flexibility and their ability to respond directly to demand.
They do not necessarily require expensive offices, elaborate management structures or extensive advertising.
Personal relationships and local knowledge are often more important.
This does not mean that such businesses are prosperous. Many provide only modest incomes and little financial security.
Nevertheless, they demonstrate something important.
Economic activity does not have to be organised through large corporations and conventional employment.
People can organise production and exchange for themselves.
That is one of the essential principles of Localism.
My argument is that the modern growth economy is approaching fundamental constraints.
Industrial civilisation developed through access to increasingly abundant and relatively inexpensive energy.
Coal, oil and natural gas made possible mechanised agriculture, mass production, motor transport, aviation, modern communications and the enormous infrastructure upon which society now depends.
But obtaining usable energy requires energy.
As the energy cost of obtaining energy rises, the surplus available to support the rest of the economy comes under pressure.
This is the importance of the Energy Cost of Energy, or ECoE.
The relationship is not simple. Technology, renewable energy, resource quality and investment all influence the outcome. Nevertheless, an economy cannot indefinitely increase its complexity without sufficient surplus energy to sustain it.
My expectation is that increasing energy and infrastructure costs, combined with debt and other resource constraints, will make sustained economic growth progressively more difficult.
The first effects will be experienced in discretionary activities.
Households struggling to afford food, energy, housing and essential services will reduce spending upon holidays, entertainment, restaurants, luxury goods and other non-essential purchases.
Businesses serving these markets will contract.
Employment opportunities will decline.
Governments will find it increasingly difficult to maintain public services and infrastructure at their present scale.
The result will not necessarily be a sudden collapse. It may be a long, uneven process of economic contraction, interrupted by temporary recoveries.
Within this process, people will have to find different ways of supporting themselves.
And this is where the South African experience becomes particularly interesting.
There is a tendency to imagine that a new economic system must be designed, legislated for and introduced by government.
I believe this misunderstands how Localism is likely to emerge.
It will develop because people find it necessary.
A redundant office worker may begin repairing household equipment.
A family with suitable land may grow vegetables for sale or exchange.
A former delivery driver may establish a small local distribution service.
A household may produce bread, preserves, clothing or furniture for neighbours.
Someone with practical skills may exchange labour for food, fuel or assistance.
Initially, these activities may supplement conventional employment.
As economic contraction continues, they could become increasingly important sources of livelihood.
There need be no grand plan.
People will respond to circumstances, using whatever resources, skills and opportunities are available to them.
That is precisely the kind of spontaneous economic organisation which Alcock describes.
Localism, in this sense, is not an ideology which must be imposed upon society.
It is a possible outcome of people adapting to changing economic conditions.
South Africa’s informal economy still depends heavily upon the wider industrial economy.
A small shop may sell goods manufactured hundreds or thousands of miles away.
A local delivery business may depend upon imported vehicles, diesel, replacement parts and telecommunications.
A food trader may depend upon industrial agriculture, refrigeration and national wholesale distribution.
The enterprise is local, but much of its economic foundation is not.
This distinction becomes crucial in a shrinking economy.
If energy and transport become progressively more expensive, many existing informal businesses will face the same pressures as conventional enterprises.
Simply replacing a supermarket with a small shop does not eliminate dependence upon distant suppliers.
A more fundamental change will be necessary.
Production itself will have to become increasingly local wherever this is practical.
Food production, repair, maintenance, basic manufacturing, building materials and some forms of energy supply may need to be organised much closer to the people who use them.
The future local economy may therefore resemble the South African informal economy in its organisation, but differ considerably in the methods and resources it employs.
It may be less dependent upon manufactured goods arriving from distant factories.
It may use more human labour and less machinery.
It may make greater use of wood, water, locally available materials and equipment capable of being repaired rather than replaced.
Above all, it will have to concentrate upon essentials.
One of the most important consequences may be a change in the economic role of the household.
Before industrialisation, many households were places of production as well as consumption.
Food was grown, preserved and prepared. Clothing was made and repaired. Tools and household equipment were maintained. Small workshops operated alongside domestic accommodation.
Industrialisation progressively separated employment from the home.
The household became principally a place where wages were spent rather than goods were produced.
Localism could reverse part of this process.
Homes, gardens, outbuildings and small plots of land may become economically productive once again.
This will not be possible for everyone. Many households lack land, suitable premises, equipment or the physical ability to undertake such work.
Consequently, the local economy will also need shared facilities, small workshops, communal growing areas and arrangements through which people can contribute according to their abilities.
The important change is that production and everyday life may become more closely connected.
An expanding informal economy raises difficult questions for government.
Modern taxation and regulation have developed around identifiable employers, registered businesses, property ownership and recorded financial transactions.
An economy containing growing numbers of small, irregular and partly informal activities will be harder to administer through these arrangements.
This does not mean that taxation, safety standards or legal protections become unnecessary.
It means that the cost and complexity of applying existing systems may become increasingly difficult to justify.
Government may have to distinguish between functions which genuinely require national organisation and those which can be undertaken more simply within localities.
Defence, national communications, specialist hospitals, taxation and certain major transport systems will still require national coordination.
But much everyday economic activity may become increasingly local.
The essential task will be to allow useful grassroots enterprise to develop while maintaining proportionate safeguards.
An attempt to force every small household activity into the administrative structures designed for large businesses could discourage precisely the economic adaptation which society needs.
Britain is not South Africa.
The two countries have different histories, institutions, levels of wealth and social arrangements.
It would be misleading to assume that Britain’s future will simply reproduce South Africa’s present informal economy.
Nor should informal enterprise be romanticised.
Poverty, insecure incomes and the absence of social protection are serious disadvantages. The objective should not be to recreate these conditions.
Nevertheless, Alcock’s account provides an important demonstration of human adaptability.
When conventional economic arrangements fail to provide sufficient opportunities, people develop alternatives.
They make use of local knowledge, personal relationships, practical skills and modest amounts of capital.
They organise economic activity without waiting for instructions from government.
This is the process which I expect to become increasingly visible in Britain as the growth economy comes under pressure.
It may already be beginning, although changes in official employment statistics alone cannot establish that this is happening.
Perhaps the most important lesson is that the formal economy is not the whole economy.
Economic activity is not confined to salaried employment, registered companies and transactions recorded in national accounts.
People can produce, repair, exchange and support one another through arrangements which conventional economic analysis does not always describe adequately.
In an expanding industrial economy, such activities may be regarded as marginal.
In a shrinking economy, they may become central.
The significance of KasiNomics Unleashed is therefore greater than its account of South African entrepreneurship.
It invites us to consider how economies organise themselves when conventional institutions do not provide sufficient livelihoods.
Alcock sees an enormous economic opportunity.
I see evidence of a capacity for grassroots economic adaptation which may become increasingly necessary.
The difference is one of circumstances and expectations.
What is developing alongside the conventional economy in South Africa may help us understand how a future local economy could emerge in Britain.
Localism will not necessarily arrive through government policy, economic planning or political reform.
It may arise gradually, locality by locality, as people discover that the most reliable way to obtain essential goods and services is increasingly to produce and exchange them closer to home.
The economy of the future may be smaller, simpler and less wealthy in conventional monetary terms.
But it need not be devoid of economic activity, enterprise or human ingenuity.
Indeed, the need for those qualities may become greater than ever.
And perhaps that is the most important lesson to be drawn from GG Alcock’s book.
23 October 2026
Something significant has happened. The British Government is now advising households to keep emergency supplies of food, water, cash and other essentials in case the systems upon which everyday life depends suddenly cease to function.
Defence Secretary Wes Streeting has warned of possible cyber attacks, disruption to supply chains and attacks on essential infrastructure. The Government’s new Be Ready campaign recommends that households should be capable of surviving for at least three days without normal services.
The advice includes tinned food, bottled water, torches, batteries, radios and cash.
Streeting has urged people to be alert rather than alarmed. Nevertheless, the implications deserve serious consideration.
For decades, governments have encouraged us to place increasing reliance upon national and international systems of production, distribution, communications and finance. Now the Government itself is acknowledging that these systems might fail.
This is not evidence that collapse is imminent. It is, however, an official recognition of vulnerabilities that have been developing for many years.
Modern Britain depends upon an extraordinary network of interconnected systems.
Food is produced, processed, transported, stored and distributed through lengthy supply chains. Supermarkets rely upon computerised ordering, electronic payments, refrigerated storage and frequent deliveries.
Electricity supports almost everything. Without it, water pumping, communications, banking, refrigeration and much of the transport system can be disrupted.
The internet has become essential to commerce, government, health services and ordinary household activities.
These systems are efficient when everything works. Their weakness is that the failure of one can quickly affect many others.
An attack upon electricity supplies can interfere with communications. Communications failures can interrupt payments. Payment failures can prevent purchases. Transport disruption can leave supermarkets without supplies.
What appears to be a collection of separate services is actually a single, highly interdependent economic structure.
The Government’s warning is an acknowledgement of this vulnerability.
The recommendation to maintain three days’ supplies is sensible as an immediate precaution. But it raises an important question.
What happens on the fourth day?
A major disruption to electricity, communications or distribution could take considerably longer than three days to resolve.
If electronic payments failed, many shops would be unable to trade normally. If fuel distribution were interrupted, deliveries could be reduced. If electricity supplies became unreliable, refrigeration and food preservation would become increasingly difficult.
Households might possess sufficient food for several days, but that would not restore the systems required to replenish their cupboards.
There is a considerable difference between preparing for a temporary emergency and creating an economy capable of functioning through prolonged disruption.
The Government is addressing the first problem. Localism offers a possible response to the second.
There is another dimension to this problem which receives much less attention.
Britain’s infrastructure is ageing. Roads, bridges, water systems, electricity networks, hospitals and public buildings require enormous expenditure merely to maintain their existing condition.
At the same time, the economy faces increasing financial pressures.
My argument is that these difficulties are not simply temporary consequences of poor management or unfortunate political decisions. They may reflect a more fundamental change in the relationship between energy, resources and economic activity.
As the energy and resources required to obtain further energy and resources increase, less surplus remains available to support the rest of the economy.
This is the problem of the rising Energy Cost of Energy.
If this process contributes to prolonged economic shrinkage, maintaining Britain’s increasingly complicated infrastructure will become progressively more difficult.
The country may find itself unable to afford the complexity upon which it has become dependent.
Cyber attacks and sabotage are immediate threats. Economic shrinkage could become a more persistent threat.
Both expose the same underlying weakness.
Not so long ago, many communities possessed a greater capacity to meet their own everyday needs.
There were local food producers, small shops, bakeries, repair workshops and numerous independent businesses.
Households often kept more food in store. Vegetable gardens were common. Some homes possessed alternative means of heating and cooking.
These arrangements were far from perfect. Living standards were generally lower, and communities remained dependent upon outside supplies for many things.
Nevertheless, the economy was less centralised.
Over the decades, much of this local capacity has disappeared.
Small businesses have been displaced by large organisations. Local food production has become increasingly specialised. Repair has frequently given way to replacement.
Employment has become concentrated in activities dependent upon complex national and international networks.
The result is an economy which may be highly productive under favourable conditions but vulnerable when those conditions change.
Localism does not require every locality to become completely self-sufficient. That would be neither realistic nor desirable.
It does mean rebuilding the capacity to provide a greater proportion of essential goods and services close to where people live.
Food production is an obvious starting point.
Local growers, small farms, market gardens, orchards and community food enterprises could reduce dependence upon distant distribution networks.
Small bakeries, food preservation businesses and local storage facilities could strengthen this capacity.
Local repair workshops could extend the life of tools, machinery, clothing and household equipment.
Locally available energy, where technically and economically practical, could provide some protection against disruption to centralised supplies.
Above all, local economic activity could become less dependent upon distant organisations and complicated systems.
This would not eliminate vulnerability. But it could reduce the number of essential functions that fail together.
There is also a human dimension.
A resilient locality needs people who know how to grow food, maintain equipment, repair buildings, preserve produce and care for neighbours.
These activities require practical skills, experience and cooperation.
They also create employment.
As a shrinking economy reduces opportunities in discretionary activities and some centralised services, essential local work could become increasingly important.
The development of Localism would therefore be more than a response to emergencies.
It could provide the foundations of a different economic structure, one better suited to a world in which energy, money and material resources become more constrained.
There will always be important national responsibilities.
Defence, major communications networks, specialist hospitals, taxation and certain transport systems require national organisation.
But it is neither necessary nor desirable for every aspect of daily life to depend upon increasingly elaborate centralised arrangements.
A smaller national core, combined with stronger local economies, could offer a more durable structure.
The Government’s present advice places responsibility upon individual households to prepare for emergencies.
That is reasonable, but insufficient.
Resilience cannot be achieved simply by putting tins of food in cupboards.
It requires communities capable of continuing essential activities when wider systems are interrupted.
That capacity must develop largely from the bottom upwards.
Streeting’s announcement should not be interpreted as proof that Britain is approaching immediate economic collapse.
The threats he identifies are real possibilities, but their timing and severity remain uncertain.
Nevertheless, the warning has a wider significance.
For the first time in many years, the Government is openly asking people to consider how they would manage without some of the services they have come to regard as permanent.
That is a considerable change in official thinking.
It invites a much larger question.
If we are being asked to prepare for the temporary failure of modern economic systems, should we not also consider whether those systems can remain affordable and dependable indefinitely?
A shrinking economy would make that question increasingly urgent.
Three days’ food and water may help a household survive a short emergency.
They cannot provide lasting economic security.
That requires something more fundamental: the rebuilding of local productive capacity, practical skills, cooperation and the means of meeting essential needs.
The Government is beginning to recognise the vulnerability of the highly centralised economy.
The investigation into Britain’s National Energy System Operator (NESO), reported by The Daily Telegraph on 20 October 2026, raises questions far more important than whether individual managers should retain their jobs. It exposes a disturbing weakness in the management of one of the country’s most essential services.
Electricity is no longer simply a convenience. Almost every aspect of modern life depends upon it. Water supplies, sewage treatment, communications, banking, food refrigeration, hospitals, heating systems and increasingly transport all rely upon a continuous supply of electricity.
Yet the people responsible for maintaining that supply appear to be operating under increasing pressure, while some of those managing them seem more concerned about public confidence than the warnings coming from their own engineers.
This is not merely a management problem. It is a warning about the increasing fragility of our national infrastructure.
The independent investigation by Eversheds Sutherland did not substantiate the four specific whistleblower allegations concerning interference with operational decisions, improper record-keeping and breaches of operational constraints.
That distinction matters. The investigation did not establish that managers deliberately concealed an impending blackout.
Nevertheless, it identified serious problems within the organisation.
Control room engineers reported high levels of stress, difficulty in raising concerns and a significant gulf between those operating the electricity system and those managing it.
Some engineers believed that issuing warnings about electricity shortages could damage the organisation’s reputation. There was concern that the public presentation of events mattered more than the operational difficulties being experienced.
During the heatwave of June 2026, the system came under considerable pressure. Engineers considered issuing warnings associated with the possibility of emergency measures to reduce electricity demand.
There were disagreements about how serious the situation had become. Nevertheless, the investigation revealed an organisation in which technical staff did not always feel free to express their concerns.
For an electricity system operator, this is particularly troubling.
An engineer’s responsibility is to identify danger before it becomes a disaster. Management must ensure that warnings are heard, not discouraged.
There is another issue underlying the investigation.
Britain is attempting to change its electricity generation system at remarkable speed.
Coal-fired power stations have disappeared. Gas-fired generation remains important, but government policy seeks to reduce its use substantially. Wind and solar generation are expected to provide an increasing proportion of electricity.
This creates difficulties that cannot be overcome by political determination alone.
Traditional power stations can generally be instructed to increase or reduce output within their operating limits. Wind turbines generate according to wind conditions. Solar panels depend upon daylight and weather.
Neither can be commanded to produce electricity when nature does not provide the necessary energy.
Battery storage, interconnectors, demand management and flexible generation can help to maintain the balance. But each has limitations, costs and dependencies.
The system must maintain sufficient supply every second of every day, including periods when renewable output is low and demand is high.
The investigation recorded engineers’ concerns that these changes were making their work more difficult. It did not independently establish that government net zero policy caused the June incident.
Nevertheless, their concerns deserve serious technical examination rather than political dismissal.
The modern electricity grid illustrates a wider problem facing the British economy.
We have created systems of extraordinary complexity which depend upon the successful operation of countless interconnected components.
Electricity must be generated, transmitted, distributed and consumed in precise balance. Increasingly, that balance depends upon sophisticated computer systems, forecasting, communications and market arrangements.
As conventional generating capacity is replaced, maintaining reliability may require additional equipment, storage, transmission capacity and control systems.
All this requires investment.
And investment requires something which Britain is finding increasingly difficult to provide: an affordable economic surplus.
The electricity system cannot be considered separately from the wider economy. Its costs must ultimately be paid by households, businesses or taxpayers.
The more complicated the system becomes, the greater the resources needed to build, maintain and operate it.
Complexity is not necessarily undesirable. But it must be affordable, manageable and resilient.
A system which performs impressively under normal conditions but struggles when circumstances become difficult is not necessarily a sound system.
There is a fundamental distinction between producing energy and obtaining a useful surplus from that production.
Every energy system consumes energy and materials in its construction, operation, maintenance and eventual replacement.
The important question is how much useful energy remains available to support the rest of society after these requirements have been met.
This is the principle underlying Energy Cost of Energy, or ECoE.
As the energy and resource costs of maintaining the energy system rise, less of the economy’s productive capacity remains available for other purposes.
Britain is already experiencing severe pressures upon public finances, household incomes and business costs.
Electricity infrastructure must compete for capital, materials and skilled labour with hospitals, housing, roads, water systems and many other essential requirements.
Government can borrow money to finance investment. It cannot borrow the physical energy, materials or skilled workers required without obtaining them from somewhere.
Nor can borrowing eliminate the future costs of maintaining what has been constructed.
This is particularly important when considering the enormous expenditure associated with rebuilding the electricity system.
The question is not simply whether the technology works.
It is whether the country can afford to construct, maintain and replace the complete system over the long term.
The electricity grid is a remarkable engineering achievement. It allows power generated in one part of the country to serve consumers hundreds of miles away.
But this advantage also creates dependence.
A failure affecting the national system can have consequences far beyond the place where the original problem occurs.
Modern communities have lost many of the means by which they once provided for themselves.
Water is often pumped electrically. Food depends upon refrigeration and long-distance distribution. Communications require powered networks. Even gas and oil heating systems frequently depend upon electricity for their controls and pumps.
A prolonged interruption would therefore affect much more than lighting.
The consequences would spread through the economy, disrupting activities which might initially appear unrelated to electricity generation.
This is a characteristic of highly interconnected systems. Their apparent efficiency can conceal their vulnerability.
The answer is not to abandon the national electricity grid.
Certain services will continue to require a national system. Major hospitals, railways, telecommunications, industry and other essential facilities cannot simply be supplied through isolated local arrangements.
But it is reasonable to question whether every household and locality should remain wholly dependent upon the uninterrupted operation of one increasingly complicated system.
Localism offers another approach.
Electricity could increasingly be generated and stored closer to where it is used. Solar panels, small-scale hydroelectricity where geography permits, appropriately located wind generation and local storage could contribute to essential needs.
Such arrangements would not eliminate dependence upon the national grid. Most domestic solar and battery installations, for example, cannot operate during a power cut unless specifically equipped for safe backup operation.
Nevertheless, properly designed local systems could provide a degree of resilience which is currently absent.
Equally important would be reducing the need for electricity.
Food grown locally requires less transport and potentially less refrigeration. Buildings designed to retain heat require less energy. Local workshops and essential services reduce dependence upon distant facilities.
Some activities could employ direct mechanical power, human labour or other appropriate forms of energy.
The objective would not be to reproduce the entire modern economy on a smaller scale.
It would be to ensure that essential needs could continue to be met when national systems became unreliable or unaffordable.
The Government’s energy ambitions are based upon an expectation that Britain can continue to mobilise the enormous resources required for technological change.
But what happens if the economy has entered a structural contraction?
If rising energy costs and declining affordability progressively reduce discretionary economic activity, maintaining existing infrastructure will become increasingly difficult.
The first priority must then be to preserve essential services rather than pursue ever more elaborate systems.
Electricity, water, food production, sanitation, basic healthcare and communications must take precedence.
This would require a change in thinking.
Instead of assuming that every technical difficulty can be overcome through additional investment, government would have to recognise the physical and financial limits within which the economy operates.
It would also require greater honesty about risk.
Engineers should not be expected to reconcile political ambitions with physical realities while being discouraged from expressing their professional concerns.
The NESO investigation is significant not because it proved a deliberate cover-up. It did not.
Its importance lies in what it revealed about the relationship between technical expertise, management and political expectations.
The people responsible for keeping Britain’s electricity flowing reported stress, operational difficulties and a reluctance to raise concerns.
These are warning signs which should never be ignored.
The electricity system is becoming more complicated at precisely the time when the country’s financial capacity to maintain and expand its infrastructure is under increasing pressure.
There is a danger that political ambition, managerial optimism and public relations will obscure the physical realities of electricity supply.
Britain needs a national grid which is technically sound, financially sustainable and managed by people prepared to listen to their engineers.
But it also needs to reconsider the wisdom of making every essential activity completely dependent upon that grid.
The real lesson is that resilience must become more important than the appearance of progress.
In a shrinking economy, the ability to maintain essential services will matter far more than the ability to announce ambitious targets.
Localism cannot solve every problem facing the electricity system. But by reducing unnecessary dependence, encouraging local provision and giving priority to essential needs, it offers a practical direction for a society which can no longer assume that increasing complexity will always bring increasing security.
The engineers’ warnings should be treated as an opportunity to reconsider our priorities before a serious failure forces that reconsideration upon us.
A Different Way of Living
In south-west France, a Buddhist community known as Plum Village has been demonstrating a way of life very different from that of modern consumer society. Founded in 1982 by the Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thích Nhất Hạnh, it is based upon simplicity, cooperation, mindfulness and respect for the natural world.
Plum Village is not an economic experiment in the conventional sense. It is a spiritual community. Nevertheless, its way of life has much to teach us about the future, particularly if we accept that the age of continuous economic growth is drawing to a close.
The central question is whether some of the principles practised at Plum Village might become increasingly relevant to ordinary communities as economic shrinkage makes present ways of living unaffordable.
Modern economic thinking assumes that prosperity depends upon increasing consumption. More goods must be manufactured, more services purchased and more money spent. Economic growth has become an objective in itself.
Plum Village starts from a different position. It places greater importance upon the quality of human life than upon the accumulation of possessions.
People live comparatively simply. They share facilities, undertake everyday tasks together and place considerable value upon activities that require little expenditure.
This is not poverty imposed by circumstances. It is simplicity adopted voluntarily.
There is an important distinction here. In a shrinking economy, many people will have little choice but to reduce their consumption. What Plum Village suggests is that living with less need not necessarily mean living less well.
Indeed, some of the activities that make life satisfying, including companionship, gardening, cooking, walking and helping others, require relatively little commercial expenditure.
The modern economy depends upon an enormous and continuous supply of energy. Fossil fuels have enabled machinery to replace human labour, food to travel thousands of miles and goods to be manufactured in one part of the world for consumption in another.
The problem is not simply the amount of energy available. It is the amount of surplus energy remaining after the energy sector has met its own requirements.
As the energy cost of obtaining energy rises, less surplus energy remains available to support the wider economy.
This is central to the argument for Localism.
Economic shrinkage will not affect every activity equally. Discretionary consumption is likely to come under pressure first, while the provision of essentials, including food, shelter, heating and care, must continue.
Plum Village offers an example of a community in which everyday life is organised around relatively modest material requirements.
It does not demonstrate that modern society can dispense with industrial energy. Its buildings, equipment, transport and other facilities still depend upon the wider economy. Nevertheless, it illustrates how human satisfaction can be less dependent upon material consumption.
One of the most striking features of Plum Village is the importance attached to community life.
Cooking, cleaning, gardening and maintaining the surroundings are shared activities. Work is not regarded simply as something undertaken in exchange for money. It is also a contribution to the wellbeing of others.
This principle has considerable relevance to Localism.
In the modern economy, many everyday needs are met through commercial transactions. People purchase services that earlier generations often provided within families, neighbourhoods or small communities.
This arrangement has been made possible by high levels of monetary income, extensive transport networks and abundant energy.
As these become less affordable, cooperation may become increasingly necessary.
Neighbours might share tools, help maintain buildings, grow food together or assist those who are elderly or disabled. Skills that have little commercial value today may become increasingly important.
Such cooperation would not eliminate the need for money or specialist services. It would, however, reduce the extent to which every human requirement must be satisfied through a commercial transaction.
Modern society tends to measure the value of work by the income it produces.
Yet many of the most essential human activities are either poorly paid or entirely unpaid.
Growing vegetables, caring for an elderly neighbour, repairing a fence, preparing meals and maintaining a home all create genuine value. Much of this activity is either excluded from economic statistics or inadequately represented within them.
Plum Village treats ordinary work as an important part of daily life.
There is a lesson here for the future.
As discretionary industries contract, increasing numbers of people may need to find useful occupations closer to home. The distinction between employment, household work and community activity may become less rigid.
Localism envisages a revival of small-scale productive activity, including food growing, repair, maintenance, woodworking and other practical skills.
This would not be a return to the past in every respect. Modern knowledge would remain valuable. But the organisation of work could become more local, more practical and less dependent upon distant employers and markets.
Perhaps the greatest lesson from Plum Village concerns human relationships.
Over the past two centuries, industrialisation, urbanisation and increasing mobility have progressively separated people from the communities in which earlier generations lived.
Families have become geographically dispersed. Employment often requires travelling considerable distances. Everyday services have become centralised, while many smaller communities have lost shops, workshops and other places where people once met.
The result has been increasing dependence upon large organisations and commercial services, accompanied in many places by a weakening of everyday social relationships.
Plum Village demonstrates the value of living within a recognisable community in which people share responsibilities and know one another.
Localism could encourage a similar rebuilding of relationships, although without the religious commitments or communal living arrangements of a monastery.
People would continue to occupy their own homes and lead their own lives. What would change is the extent to which they depended upon one another locally.
A locality would become more than a collection of houses. It would increasingly become a functioning social and economic community.
Plum Village also demonstrates the importance of maintaining a relationship with the land.
Its organic Happy Farms produce vegetables for the community’s meals. Food growing is regarded not merely as agricultural production, but as an activity connecting people with the natural world.
In a future of more expensive energy, local food production is likely to become increasingly important.
Modern agriculture depends heavily upon machinery, fertilisers, transport, refrigeration and complex distribution systems. Rising costs could make some of these arrangements progressively less affordable.
Localism therefore envisages more land being cultivated close to where people live, with greater use of human labour and smaller-scale methods.
Gardens, allotments, orchards and small farms could become increasingly important sources of food.
Plum Village cannot be regarded as proof that a community can become entirely self-sufficient. But it demonstrates that food production can be integrated into ordinary community life rather than treated as a distant industrial activity.
There are important differences between Plum Village and the kind of Localism that may emerge through economic necessity.
Plum Village is a voluntary religious community. Its members have chosen a particular way of life and share a common philosophy.
An ordinary British locality contains people of different ages, abilities, beliefs and interests. Many will have little desire to participate in communal activities.
Moreover, Plum Village operates within a prosperous industrial society. It benefits from modern infrastructure, healthcare, transport and the wider economy. Its existence does not establish that a similar community could provide all its requirements independently.
There is also the question of scale.
A monastery with a few hundred residents is very different from a town of several thousand people. The arrangements suitable for one cannot simply be imposed upon the other.
Localism must therefore develop through practical necessity and voluntary cooperation, rather than through the adoption of a prescribed communal lifestyle.
Nevertheless, the principles of simplicity, mutual assistance and shared responsibility remain relevant.
The most important distinction is that Plum Village represents a deliberate choice, while Localism may increasingly emerge as an economic necessity.
As surplus energy becomes more constrained and the costs of maintaining complex systems rise, the present highly centralised economy may become progressively harder to sustain.
Some activities will necessarily remain national. Defence, telecommunications, specialist hospitals and major transport infrastructure cannot realistically be organised entirely at the level of individual localities.
But many everyday essentials could increasingly be provided closer to home.
Food production, repair, maintenance, basic care and numerous small services could become more local.
This would not require everyone to embrace Buddhism, communal ownership or any particular philosophy.
It would simply reflect the practical advantages of meeting more needs with fewer resources and shorter supply chains.
In this respect, Plum Village is valuable not as a blueprint but as a demonstration of possibilities.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to accepting economic shrinkage is the assumption that a reduction in material consumption must inevitably mean a corresponding reduction in human wellbeing.
For generations, governments have encouraged the belief that rising incomes and increasing expenditure are the principal measures of progress.
Plum Village challenges this assumption.
Its philosophy suggests that human satisfaction can arise from relationships, useful activity, a sense of belonging and an appreciation of the natural world.
These are not substitutes for essential material requirements. People still need adequate food, warmth, shelter, healthcare and security.
But once these needs are met, greater consumption does not necessarily produce a better life.
This distinction could become increasingly important in a shrinking economy.
If society continues to judge success entirely by the standards of economic growth, shrinkage will be regarded only as failure.
If, however, prosperity comes to be understood more broadly, the revival of local communities might offer compensating benefits.
Plum Village is not a model for the future organisation of the British economy. It is a Buddhist community established for spiritual purposes, not an experiment in surviving economic collapse.
Nevertheless, it provides a useful reminder that the highly individualistic, consumption-driven society of the modern industrial age is not the only possible way of organising human life.
People can cooperate rather than compete in every activity. They can share resources, undertake useful work without monetary reward and derive satisfaction from belonging to a community.
Localism is likely to emerge for very different reasons. It will be driven principally by the declining affordability of the energy-intensive systems upon which modern society depends.
Yet the resulting changes may lead towards some of the same principles.
The future may require us to consume less, travel less, repair more, grow more of our own food and depend more upon the people around us.
Plum Village suggests that such a life need not be regarded entirely as a loss.
The real challenge will be to preserve the essential achievements of modern civilisation while rediscovering the social and practical strengths of smaller communities.
In a world accustomed to measuring progress by how much more it can consume, perhaps the most important lesson from Plum Village is that a society can become materially poorer without necessarily becoming poorer in every other sense.
Tim Stanley, writing in The Daily Telegraph on 19 October 2026, argues that France’s growing disorder is a warning of what may soon happen throughout Europe, including Britain. He sees the violence, political extremism and loss of social cohesion as symptoms of something much deeper: the collapse of the moral and philosophical foundations of Western society.
He may well be right about the direction of events. But there is another explanation, one that goes beyond philosophy and politics. What we are witnessing may be the early social consequences of an economic system that can no longer deliver what people have been taught to expect.
And that raises a much more important question. If the existing system is becoming unsustainable, what will replace it?
For generations, Western societies have been organised around the assumption of continuing economic growth. Governments have promised better public services, rising living standards, expanding welfare provision and greater opportunities for each succeeding generation.
These promises depended upon an expanding economy.
Growth made it possible to increase public spending without taking too much from existing taxpayers. It allowed governments to borrow against anticipated future prosperity. It supported an increasingly complicated society in which growing numbers of people worked in administration, finance, regulation and services rather than producing life’s essentials.
But the foundations of this arrangement are weakening.
The economy depends upon energy. More precisely, it depends upon the surplus energy remaining after the energy industry has met its own requirements. As the energy cost of obtaining energy (ECoE) rises, the surplus available to support the wider economy comes under pressure.
This does not mean that energy is physically running out. It means that maintaining the energy supply, and the increasingly complex systems dependent upon it, becomes more costly.
Technology may offset some of these pressures, but it cannot abolish the underlying requirement for energy and materials.
The result is an economy struggling to maintain commitments made during a period when continuing growth seemed assured.
Governments respond by borrowing more, raising taxes and attempting to preserve institutions that have become increasingly expensive to operate.
But borrowing cannot create the real resources needed to sustain an economy indefinitely. It merely transfers financial obligations into the future.
Stanley attributes much of the violence in France to destructive philosophies and the loss of traditional values.
There may be something in this. But it is difficult to separate attitudes from economic circumstances.
Young people have grown up being told that education, hard work and ambition will bring prosperity. Yet many face expensive housing, insecure employment, limited prospects and public services under increasing strain.
They see older generations possessing houses and assets that they themselves may never afford.
At the same time, governments continue to promise improvements that they seem increasingly unable to deliver.
The resulting disappointment creates fertile ground for political extremism.
None of this excuses violence or the destruction of property. But simply condemning the attitudes of those involved does little to explain why discontent is spreading.
There is a deeper problem. Society continues to promise the rewards of economic expansion when the material foundations of that expansion are becoming less secure.
This contradiction cannot be resolved by changing political parties or adopting a different philosophy.
France and Britain have something important in common. Both have developed highly centralised systems of government.
Decisions affecting everyday life are increasingly made by institutions far removed from the communities experiencing their consequences.
National governments attempt to manage housing, education, health, transport, energy, employment and welfare through complicated administrative systems.
As economic pressures increase, these arrangements become harder to finance and maintain.
Governments then face impossible choices. Higher taxation weakens household purchasing power and businesses. Reduced expenditure provokes opposition from those who depend upon public services. Additional borrowing increases future obligations and debt-servicing costs.
Every proposed solution seems to create another problem.
Political parties offer different ways of distributing the available money, but few confront the possibility that the amount of real economic activity available to support the system may itself be contracting.
This helps explain why political dissatisfaction persists regardless of which party holds office.
The problem is becoming structural rather than simply political.
Modern Western societies have become extraordinarily complicated.
Food travels enormous distances. Energy depends upon extensive networks. Essential goods require international supply chains. Public services depend upon layers of administration and specialised technology.
All of this requires energy, materials, skilled labour and money.
Complexity is affordable when the economy generates sufficient surplus to maintain it. When that surplus contracts, complexity becomes a burden.
Infrastructure deteriorates because maintenance is postponed. Public services become less reliable. Businesses close because their costs exceed what customers can afford.
Governments struggle to maintain the systems upon which people have become dependent.
The consequences are not necessarily sudden. Economic contraction may appear first as declining quality, longer waiting times, reduced services, higher prices and increasing debt.
Only later does the underlying deterioration become unmistakable.
Social unrest may therefore be a consequence of economic shrinkage rather than its principal cause.
Towards the end of his article, Stanley suggests that people may withdraw from failing national institutions and form close communities capable of preserving social order and traditional values.
This is perhaps the most interesting part of his argument.
He is approaching, from a philosophical direction, something remarkably close to Localism.
But Localism need not be a deliberate political or religious movement. Nor does it require people to abandon society and establish isolated communities.
It can emerge naturally as economic circumstances change.
When long-distance distribution becomes more expensive, local production becomes more attractive. When large organisations can no longer afford their administrative structures, smaller arrangements become more practical. When national services become less reliable, people increasingly depend upon those living and working nearby.
Food production, maintenance, repair, care and other essential activities begin to acquire greater importance.
The distinction between economic and social life becomes less pronounced. People increasingly know those who produce their food, maintain their buildings and provide everyday services.
The locality becomes more than a place of residence. It becomes an increasingly important economic and social unit.
This does not mean that everything must become local.
Defence, telecommunications, specialist hospitals, national railways and certain other functions will continue to require national organisation.
But much of everyday economic activity could become more local because this would reduce the energy, transport and administrative costs associated with maintaining complex national and international systems.
Localism would not necessarily be chosen through political debate. It could develop because economic circumstances increasingly favour it.
One of the greatest changes brought about by industrialisation was the separation of people from the communities upon which they had previously depended.
Employment drew people away from their families. Large organisations replaced many local arrangements. Shops and services became concentrated in distant centres. Increasing mobility made it possible to live without knowing one’s neighbours.
Economic growth made this possible.
People could purchase services that earlier generations had provided for one another.
But as household purchasing power comes under pressure, this arrangement becomes less secure.
Families may increasingly need to live closer together. Neighbours may share equipment, skills and responsibilities. Elderly people may depend more upon local networks of assistance. Small businesses and workshops may become important sources of employment.
Such developments will not eliminate hardship or conflict. Nor should we romanticise the difficulties of earlier rural and urban communities.
Nevertheless, mutual dependence can provide a stronger foundation for social cohesion than reliance upon distant institutions.
A society in which people contribute directly to the wellbeing of those around them may have less need for the elaborate administrative structures that have grown up during the age of economic expansion.
France has a long tradition of public protest and confrontation. Britain has generally expressed dissatisfaction differently.
There is no certainty that the violence seen in France will be repeated here on the same scale.
But Britain faces many of the same underlying pressures.
Public debt is enormous. Essential infrastructure requires substantial expenditure. Local authorities face financial difficulties. Housing is increasingly unaffordable for younger people. Public services are struggling to meet expectations.
Meanwhile, political debate remains dominated by arguments about how to restore economic growth.
Very little attention is given to the possibility that sustained growth may no longer be achievable in the form upon which the present system depends.
If that possibility becomes reality, the political arguments of today will increasingly lose their relevance.
The central question will no longer be how to distribute the benefits of growth.
It will be how to organise society when those benefits are no longer available.
Tim Stanley’s article ends with a bleak assessment of Western civilisation.
But fiscal and societal breakdown need not mean the end of organised society.
It may mean the end of a particular form of organisation.
The highly centralised, energy-intensive and financially dependent arrangements developed during the age of industrial expansion may gradually become unaffordable.
As they contract, other arrangements will emerge.
Some will undoubtedly be difficult and disorderly. Economic shrinkage is unlikely to be painless. There will be resistance from those whose livelihoods and expectations depend upon preserving the existing system.
But there will also be opportunities to rebuild economic and social relationships on a smaller and more sustainable scale.
The danger is that governments will devote their remaining resources to maintaining institutions that can no longer be afforded, rather than allowing and supporting practical alternatives to develop.
Localism offers a different perspective.
It does not promise to restore the prosperity of the past. It recognises that a shrinking economy will require a different organisation of everyday life.
It places greater emphasis upon essential production, practical skills, local employment, mutual assistance and reduced dependence upon distant systems.
Most importantly, it recognises that the future need not be designed and imposed from above.
It can evolve from below, locality by locality, as people adapt to changing economic realities.
Stanley may be right that Britain is following France towards fiscal and social breakdown.
But he leaves unanswered the most important question.
What happens afterwards?
The answer may not be another political ideology, another government programme or another attempt to revive economic growth.
It may be the natural emergence of Localism as the economic and social organisation of a post-growth society.
And, unlike the political movements that seek to preserve an increasingly unaffordable system, Localism does not have to wait for permission from government.
It can begin wherever people live.
One of the less recognised costs of economic growth has been the geographical separation of families. Parents, children, grandparents and siblings may remain affectionate and concerned about one another, yet live too far apart to provide everyday help.
This separation did not happen at one particular moment. It developed over several centuries. Industrialisation accelerated it during the nineteenth century. Further changes in employment, housing, education and transport encouraged it after the Second World War.
There is an important historical distinction. Families in England did not universally live in large households containing several generations. Cambridge research shows that households consisting of parents and their children were common long before industrialisation. Separate households, however, could still belong to a wider network of relatives living nearby. Living in different houses is quite different from living at opposite ends of the country.
Work began to determine where people lived
As factories, mines and industrial towns expanded from the late eighteenth century, they drew workers from other places. A young person’s livelihood increasingly depended on going where an employer needed labour. Family connections became one consideration among several, rather than the foundation around which a working life could be built.
Changes in agriculture added to these pressures. Enclosure altered access to land and common resources, although historians disagree about how much it directly caused migration to towns. It should therefore be understood as one influence among several, rather than a complete explanation.
Migration did not always separate families permanently. Relatives sometimes followed one another and established new networks in industrial neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, the growing economy created a recurring expectation: people should move to obtain work.
Separation acquired new momentum after 1945
Post-war rebuilding offered better homes and relief from overcrowding. The New Towns Act of 1946 enabled new settlements, many intended to accommodate people moving out of London. These were valuable improvements, but moving a household could also increase its distance from relatives who stayed behind.
Higher education provided another route away from home. Leaving to study could become the first stage of a permanent move, followed by employment elsewhere. ONS research has documented the relationship between educational attainment and migration, including a net loss of graduates from rural English areas in its study.
Career advancement could require further moves. Two partners might have to reconcile jobs in different places. Cars and improved transport made greater distances manageable, allowing families to maintain contact without remaining close enough for ordinary daily involvement.
Housing added another constraint. Someone might find work near their parents but be unable to afford a home there. The House of Commons Library identifies young people and families being forced away from their local areas as one consequence of insufficient affordable rural housing.
These changes were driven by opportunity as well as necessity. Moving could bring better pay, education, independence and escape from restrictive circumstances. The difficulty was that the benefits were visible immediately, while the loss of nearby support might become apparent only years later.
The costs emerge when help is needed
Distance matters most when circumstances change.
A grandparent may be willing to help with children but live three hours away. An adult child may want to support an ageing parent but have a job and household elsewhere. A short visit becomes a journey requiring planning, expense and time off work.
Small needs can consequently become larger problems. Collecting a prescription, preparing a meal or noticing that someone is becoming unwell is relatively straightforward when a trusted person lives nearby. At a distance, each task may require a separate arrangement.
Geographical separation does not explain every case of loneliness or pressure on care services. Bereavement, illness, poverty and difficult relationships also matter. Nor does living alone necessarily mean being lonely. Nevertheless, the scale of potential need is substantial: the 2021 Census recorded 3.3 million people aged 65 and over living alone in England and Wales.
My argument is that an economy organised around mobility has underestimated the practical value of proximity. It counts the earnings gained by moving more readily than the everyday support lost through separation.
How localism could reverse the pressure
Localism could change the reasons people have for staying, leaving and returning.
If more livelihoods develop around local essentials, including food, repairs, care, building maintenance and small-scale production, more people could earn a living within reach of their families. Young adults would have greater scope to establish independent households nearby.
This is a possible direction of change, rather than an automatic consequence of economic shrinkage. The loss of employment could also force people to move. Localism would need practical foundations: access to land and premises, affordable housing, useful training and dependable local services.
The aim would be to make proximity a realistic choice. Several generations could live in separate homes while sharing meals, tools, transport, knowledge and occasional care. Older people could contribute experience and companionship. Younger people could help with physically demanding tasks. Support could flow in both directions.
The same principle applies in towns. Localism could strengthen neighbourhood economies and allow people to build working lives closer to existing relationships.
Family support would still need to sit alongside professional care. Responsibilities should be shared, rather than falling by default on one woman or one already exhausted relative. People without nearby family would need equally strong networks of friends, neighbours and local services.
A shrinking economy may make long journeys and purchased services harder to afford. That would increase the value of dependable relationships close to home. But rebuilding those relationships requires time, suitable homes and opportunities to work locally.
For generations, economic advancement has often meant leaving. Localism could make staying, or coming back, a practical way to build a worthwhile life. Families would then have more opportunity to be present in one another’s lives when their presence matters most.
The crisis facing Britain’s water industry illustrates a much wider problem. The country is increasingly unable to afford the infrastructure it already possesses, yet politicians continue to propose changes of ownership as though these could somehow overcome the financial difficulties.
Andy Burnham’s proposals for greater public control of the water industry are a case in point. There is considerable public support for bringing water companies back into state ownership. After years of rising bills, sewage pollution, excessive borrowing and payments to shareholders, it is hardly surprising that privatisation has become deeply unpopular.
But public dissatisfaction does not make nationalisation financially possible.
Indeed, the very financial problems that have discredited privatisation also make nationalisation extraordinarily difficult.
A report in the Daily Telegraph of 17 October 2026 describes a warning from Moody’s, the international credit ratings agency, that proposals for greater public ownership could trigger another financial crisis in the water industry.
Moody’s warns that political uncertainty could discourage investment, increase borrowing costs and lead to further credit rating downgrades.
This is particularly serious because the water companies are already heavily dependent upon borrowing to finance their operations and investment programmes.
Thames Water provides an extraordinary example.
The company is seeking another £2.4 billion from creditors who have already provided £3 billion to keep it operating. A wider rescue proposal involving some £10 billion is under consideration.
These are enormous sums, yet they concern only one company.
The difficulty is that the money being borrowed does not necessarily create new productive assets. Much of it is required to maintain, repair and modernise infrastructure that has deteriorated over many decades.
In other words, the industry is borrowing heavily simply to keep an essential service functioning.
This is a warning of something much more serious than a failure of privatisation.
There is a widespread assumption that returning water companies to public ownership would eliminate the financial problems associated with private shareholders.
Certainly, public ownership could remove the requirement to pay dividends to private investors. It might also reduce some financing and administrative costs.
But it would not eliminate the industry’s debts, its deteriorating infrastructure or the enormous expenditure required to maintain water supplies and sewage treatment.
The Government would face several major financial obligations.
First, there would be the cost of acquiring the companies. The amount would depend upon their valuations, the treatment of existing shareholders and creditors, and the terms of any legislation. Nationalisation would not necessarily require paying the full market value of every company’s assets, but compensation and legal disputes could still be substantial.
Second, there would be the problem of existing debt. Some debt might be restructured or written down, but the losses would have to fall somewhere. Creditors, pension funds and other investors would be affected.
Third, the Government would inherit responsibility for financing future investment.
This is perhaps the greatest problem of all.
The water industry requires expenditure running into many tens of billions of pounds to replace ageing pipes, improve sewage treatment, reduce pollution and provide additional capacity.
Changing the ownership of these assets does nothing to reduce the physical work required.
Britain’s public finances are already under immense pressure.
The national debt is measured in trillions of pounds. Interest payments consume a substantial part of public expenditure. The NHS, social care, defence, education, local government and transport are all competing for resources.
The Government is also confronted by the growing cost of maintaining existing public infrastructure.
Roads are deteriorating. Bridges require repair. Hospitals and schools need rebuilding. Railway infrastructure is expensive to maintain. Flood defences require substantial additional expenditure.
Where, then, would the money for water nationalisation come from?
There are only a few possibilities.
The Government could raise taxation, increase borrowing, reduce expenditure elsewhere or require water customers to pay more.
None is attractive.
Higher taxation would further reduce the disposable income of households already struggling with the cost of living.
Additional borrowing would increase the national debt and potentially the cost of servicing it.
Reducing other public expenditure would transfer the financial difficulty from one essential service to another.
Increasing water bills would undermine one of the principal political arguments for nationalisation.
Public ownership might change who borrows the money and how it is financed. It would not remove the need to pay for the work.
There is a further difficulty that is largely absent from the political debate.
The water industry is an extremely energy-intensive undertaking.
Water must be extracted, treated, pumped, stored and distributed. Sewage must be collected, pumped and processed. Treatment plants require electricity, chemicals, specialist equipment and constant maintenance.
The replacement of underground pipes involves excavation, transport, machinery, manufactured materials and skilled labour.
All these activities depend upon energy.
As the cost of obtaining energy rises, so does the real cost of maintaining infrastructure.
This is particularly important when considering the Energy Cost of Energy, or ECoE. As more of society’s resources are required to obtain usable energy, fewer remain available for other activities.
The result is a gradual reduction in the economic surplus available to maintain the complex infrastructure upon which modern society depends.
The water industry is therefore facing two related problems.
One is financial. The other is the increasing physical cost of maintaining an enormous and ageing network.
Nationalisation would solve neither automatically.
Politicians frequently speak of the need for greater investment in infrastructure.
But there is an important distinction between investment that creates additional productive capacity and expenditure required simply to maintain what already exists.
Replacing a worn-out water main may be essential, but it does not necessarily increase the amount of water available or create additional economic output.
It restores a service that would otherwise deteriorate.
The same applies to repairing roads, replacing bridges and maintaining railway lines.
An increasing proportion of national expenditure is required merely to prevent the existing infrastructure from becoming unusable.
This is one of the characteristics of an economy approaching, or entering, structural contraction.
The country is spending more to stand still.
Borrowing can conceal this difficulty for a time, but it cannot eliminate it.
Eventually, the cost of maintaining the existing system exceeds what the economy can comfortably support.
Water supply is particularly interesting from the perspective of Localism.
Historically, many communities obtained water from wells, springs, streams and relatively small local supply systems.
The development of large networks brought enormous public health benefits. Modern water treatment and sewage disposal have helped eliminate diseases that once killed thousands.
These achievements must not be dismissed.
Nevertheless, the present system is highly centralised, technically complex and expensive to maintain.
A future Localist economy would have to examine whether some of this complexity could gradually be reduced.
Rainwater harvesting, local water storage, the protection of springs and groundwater, reduced consumption and carefully designed small-scale treatment systems could all have a part to play.
Some localities might be able to meet a greater proportion of their needs from nearby resources.
Others, particularly large towns and cities, would remain dependent upon extensive shared infrastructure.
There would also be important limits. Drinking water requires reliable treatment and testing. Sewage disposal must protect public health and the environment. Small systems are not automatically cheaper or safer than large ones.
Localism would therefore not mean abandoning modern water supply. It would mean gradually developing arrangements that are less dependent upon expensive, distant and energy-intensive infrastructure wherever this is practical.
Such changes would take decades.
They would also require investment, but potentially on a smaller and more manageable scale.
The argument between privatisation and nationalisation is essentially an argument about ownership.
One side believes private enterprise is better equipped to manage essential services. The other believes public ownership would remove the profit motive and allow decisions to be made in the public interest.
Both arguments contain elements of truth.
Private ownership has clearly failed to prevent serious financial and environmental problems in parts of the water industry.
Public ownership could provide greater democratic accountability and remove some of the costs associated with private capital.
But neither form of ownership can escape the physical and financial realities.
The pipes still have to be replaced. The treatment works still have to operate. The electricity, chemicals, machinery and labour still have to be paid for.
Most importantly, the money must ultimately come from the same national economy.
Changing the ownership does not create additional national wealth.
The argument for nationalisation may be politically attractive, but comprehensive nationalisation of Britain’s water industry is, under present financial conditions, effectively impossible to finance without imposing substantial additional costs elsewhere.
The Government could acquire the companies through legislation, debt restructuring or negotiated purchases. It could even assume control of failing businesses at relatively little immediate cost in certain circumstances.
But acquiring ownership is not the same as financing the industry.
The Government would inherit an ageing infrastructure, enormous investment requirements and the continuing obligation to provide safe water and sewage treatment.
These responsibilities would compete directly with the already unaffordable demands of other essential public services.
Nor would nationalisation reverse the underlying economic forces. Rising energy costs, declining economic surplus and the increasing expense of maintaining complex infrastructure would remain.
Britain’s water crisis is therefore not simply evidence that privatisation has failed.
It is evidence of something more fundamental.
The country is becoming unable to afford the infrastructure upon which its present way of life depends.
Nationalisation would transfer responsibility for that problem from private companies to the state. It would not make the problem disappear.
The long-term answer is unlikely to be found in another change of ownership. It will require a fundamental reconsideration of the scale, complexity and cost of the systems society can realistically maintain.
That is precisely the question which Localism seeks to address.
The central issue is no longer simply who should own Britain’s water industry.
It is whether Britain can continue to afford the system it has built.
The Earth as a self-regulating system and what it can teach us about the future of human society
In 1979, the British scientist James Lovelock published a remarkable book, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. In it, he proposed that the Earth should not be understood simply as a collection of living organisms inhabiting an otherwise lifeless planet. Instead, life and its physical surroundings form an interconnected system capable of regulating many of the conditions upon which life depends.
Lovelock called this the Gaia hypothesis, taking the name from the ancient Greek goddess of the Earth.
Nearly half a century later, his ideas have particular relevance to the emerging age of Localism.
Lovelock observed that living organisms do much more than adapt to their surroundings. They also change those surroundings.
Plants absorb carbon dioxide and release oxygen. Forests influence rainfall and temperature. Marine organisms affect the chemistry of the oceans. Soil organisms recycle nutrients and help maintain fertility. Countless biological processes interact with the atmosphere, water and rocks.
These interactions can create feedback mechanisms which help stabilise environmental conditions.
Lovelock suggested that the Earth’s capacity to sustain life had been maintained partly through these relationships over immense periods of geological time.
This did not mean that the Earth was a conscious organism, deliberately controlling its environment. Nor did it mean that nature always maintains a comfortable equilibrium. Rather, it meant that living and non-living components of the planet were inseparable parts of a complex system.
Some aspects of Lovelock’s original hypothesis remain scientifically contested, particularly the suggestion that the Earth as a whole tends towards conditions favourable to life. Nevertheless, his emphasis on the interaction between life and the physical environment has had a lasting influence on Earth-system science.
One of the most important features of Gaia is the role of feedback.
Consider a natural woodland. Trees grow by drawing nutrients from the soil. Their leaves fall and decay, returning nutrients to the ground. Fungi and microorganisms break down organic matter. Rainfall replenishes moisture, while vegetation reduces erosion.
The woodland is not managed by a central authority. Its functioning emerges from countless local interactions.
There are limits to this self-regulation. Drought, disease, fire and changes in climate can overwhelm the system. Nevertheless, the woodland illustrates how order can emerge without central direction.
This is where Gaia begins to have significance for Localism.
For most of human history, communities depended heavily upon their immediate surroundings.
Food was grown locally. Timber provided fuel and building materials. Water came from nearby springs, wells and streams. Waste was frequently returned to the land. Craftsmen worked with materials available within a relatively short distance.
These communities were far from self-sufficient, and many depended upon trade. Nevertheless, their economic activities were constrained by the productive capacity of the land and the energy available to them.
Industrialisation progressively weakened these constraints.
Coal, followed by oil, gas and electricity, enabled goods, people and materials to move over ever-greater distances. Food could be produced thousands of miles from where it was consumed. Manufacturing became concentrated in large factories. Towns and cities became increasingly dependent upon distant supplies.
The resulting economic system brought enormous material benefits. But it also allowed human communities to become increasingly detached from the ecological processes upon which they ultimately depended.
A modern city may consume food, energy and materials from across the world while returning little of its waste to the places from which those resources originated.
The feedback between consumption and its consequences has become weak and remote.
The availability of abundant, relatively cheap fossil-fuel energy surplus made this separation possible.
As long as the energy required to extract resources, manufacture goods and transport them remained affordable, the geographical distance between production and consumption appeared to matter little.
Economic growth encouraged further specialisation and concentration.
Large farms replaced many smaller holdings. Local workshops disappeared. Small shops gave way to supermarkets supplied by national and international distribution systems. Public services were increasingly centralised.
The economy became more complex, but also more dependent upon uninterrupted supplies of energy, materials, finance and transport.
The difficulty arises when the energy cost of obtaining energy itself increases.
A rising Energy Cost of Energy, or ECoE, reduces the surplus energy available to support the wider economy. If this occurs on a sufficient scale, activities dependent upon large amounts of discretionary energy become progressively harder to sustain.
This does not automatically mean that economic contraction is inevitable. Technology, efficiency and alternative energy sources can offset some pressures. But if affordable surplus energy declines, the economic consequences could be profound.
It is under these circumstances that the relationship between Gaia and Localism becomes particularly interesting.
Localism does not mean attempting to recreate the past.
It means reorganising much of economic and social life around the resources, needs and capabilities of individual localities.
A locality producing more of its own food becomes more directly aware of the condition of its soil, the availability of water and the importance of maintaining fertility.
A locality depending partly upon nearby woodland for heating has a strong incentive to ensure that timber is harvested sustainably.
A community using local water resources must take greater responsibility for protecting them.
In each case, the consequences of economic activity become more visible to those undertaking it.
The relationship between action and consequence is restored.
This resembles one of the central insights of Gaia. Stability need not depend entirely upon instructions from above. It can emerge through the interaction of many smaller systems, provided that the feedback between them remains effective.
There is, however, an important qualification. Local systems do not automatically regulate themselves wisely. Forests can be overexploited, soils exhausted and water polluted. Effective local institutions, knowledge and cooperation remain essential.
We might usefully think of a locality as an economic ecosystem.
Its farmers produce food. Its woodland supplies timber and fuel. Its builders maintain buildings using materials available nearby wherever practicable. Its craftsmen repair tools and equipment. Its shops distribute essential goods. Its care workers look after those unable to care for themselves.
Waste from one activity may become a resource for another.
Food waste and suitable organic materials can be composted and returned to the soil. Timber offcuts can become fuel. Buildings can be repaired rather than demolished. Tools can be maintained rather than discarded.
Money circulates through the locality rather than immediately leaving it.
The objective is not complete self-sufficiency, which would be impractical for most communities. It is to develop greater local resilience while reducing dependence upon distant and energy-intensive systems.
The closer these activities become, the easier it is to recognise their interdependence.
Gaia does not suggest that every part of a system should operate in isolation.
The Earth’s oceans, atmosphere, land and living organisms are connected through processes operating at many different scales.
Similarly, Localism does not require the disappearance of national government.
Some functions must remain national. Defence, telecommunications, specialist hospitals, intercity railways, taxation and essential national infrastructure cannot sensibly be organised independently by every locality.
The distinction lies between those activities which genuinely require large-scale coordination and those which can operate effectively closer to the people they serve.
The future may therefore involve two complementary levels of organisation.
A relatively limited national framework would maintain those services requiring national coordination.
Individual localities would assume increasing responsibility for everyday economic and social activities.
Such an arrangement would be neither wholly centralised nor entirely decentralised.
It would resemble a complex natural system in which local processes operate within a wider framework.
Lovelock’s work also draws attention to the vulnerability of complex systems.
A system may remain apparently stable for a long period before changing circumstances push it beyond its capacity to adjust.
Modern economies contain many similar vulnerabilities.
Electricity networks depend upon continuous balancing. Food distribution depends upon transport and refrigeration. Hospitals depend upon elaborate supply chains. Communications depend upon electricity and sophisticated electronic equipment.
These systems are highly effective while their supporting conditions remain favourable.
But their complexity can also create dependencies which are difficult to replace when something fails.
Localism offers a means of reducing some of these vulnerabilities.
A locality with food production, repair facilities, local sources of heat and practical skills may be better able to withstand interruptions to national supplies than one entirely dependent upon distant provision.
This does not eliminate risk. Local harvests can fail and local resources can be exhausted. Connections between localities remain valuable precisely because they allow assistance when one locality encounters difficulties.
The objective should therefore be resilience through a combination of local capability and wider cooperation.
Perhaps the deepest connection between Gaia and Localism concerns limits.
Industrial civilisation has tended to treat the natural environment as an almost unlimited source of resources and a convenient destination for waste.
Economic success has generally been measured by the increasing quantity of goods and services produced and consumed.
Its productive capacity, although remarkable, is not unlimited. Natural processes operate within physical constraints. Soil formation, forest regeneration and the replenishment of water all take time.
Lovelock’s work reminds us that humanity exists within these processes rather than outside them.
An economy organised around essential needs, maintenance, repair and the sustainable use of nearby resources may require less energy and fewer material inputs than one organised around continuously expanding consumption.
Such an economy would not necessarily produce the greatest possible monetary output.
It might, however, prove better suited to a future in which affordable energy and resources are more constrained.
There is another important connection.
Gaia describes a world shaped by innumerable interactions occurring over long periods. No central authority designed the Earth’s ecosystems.
Localism, too, can be understood as an evolutionary process.
As economic conditions change, households may begin growing more food. Small producers may find new markets. Repair trades may return. Local energy production may become more attractive. Communities may develop new ways of providing care and other essential services.
These developments need not follow a single national blueprint.
They may arise independently in different localities, reflecting their geography, resources, population and existing skills.
Some will succeed. Others will fail. Experience will gradually reveal which arrangements work best.
This is not an argument against planning or cooperation. It is an argument against assuming that a complex society can be successfully reorganised in every detail through central direction.
James Lovelock did not devise the Gaia hypothesis as an argument for Localism. His concern was the relationship between living organisms and the physical Earth.
Nevertheless, his work offers a valuable way of thinking about the organisation of human society.
The natural world demonstrates the importance of interdependence, feedback, resource cycles and adaptation.
Modern industrial civilisation has achieved remarkable things by overcoming many immediate geographical constraints. But in doing so it has also created an economic system whose dependence upon distant resources and complex infrastructure is often poorly understood.
If the era of abundant, affordable surplus energy is drawing to a close, societies will increasingly need to rediscover the value of local production, local knowledge and local responsibility.
This need not involve abandoning national cooperation or modern scientific knowledge.
It would mean recognising that human economic activity must ultimately operate within the physical and ecological limits of the Earth.
Gaia provides a way of understanding those limits. Localism offers one possible way of organising human society to live more successfully within them.
The two ideas are not identical. But they share a fundamental insight: enduring systems depend less upon unlimited expansion than upon maintaining workable relationships between their constituent parts.
In that sense, Localism may be seen not merely as an economic response to declining surplus energy, but as a way of bringing human society into closer alignment with the natural processes upon which its existence depends.
Climate Change, Property Values and the Shrinking Economy
For generations, home ownership has been regarded as one of the safest forms of personal wealth. A house provides shelter, security and an asset which can be sold, inherited or used as security for borrowing. Much of Britain’s financial system has been built around the assumption that residential property will retain its value.
That assumption is now coming under threat.
An article by Harry Brennan in The Daily Telegraph on 14 October 2026 reports warnings from senior figures in the insurance industry that climate change could make increasing numbers of British homes difficult, or even impossible, to insure.
The implications extend far beyond the insurance industry. They could undermine the mortgage market, reduce property values, damage household wealth and add another source of instability to an economy already struggling with the consequences of declining growth.
There is also an important connection with Localism.
Insurance works by spreading risk across large numbers of policyholders. Most properties suffer no serious damage in any particular year, allowing the premiums collected from many households to pay the claims of relatively few.
But what happens when the risks increase substantially?
Flooding, subsidence, coastal erosion and wildfires are becoming increasingly important considerations for insurers. Where damage becomes more frequent, insurance premiums must rise. Where the probability of serious damage becomes too great, insurers may withdraw cover altogether.
This is not simply a theoretical possibility.
Tenbury Wells in Worcestershire has already attracted attention as an example of a town where repeated flooding has created serious difficulties in obtaining affordable flood insurance.
The Environment Agency estimates that around 6.3 million properties in England are currently at risk of flooding, with the number potentially increasing substantially by the middle of the century. Subsidence presents another growing problem, particularly where prolonged dry periods affect clay soils.
There is an important distinction between a property being at risk and becoming uninsurable. Nevertheless, increasing physical risks inevitably raise questions about the long-term availability and affordability of insurance.
The financial implications are potentially enormous.
Mortgage lenders normally require buildings insurance because the property provides security for the loan. If that security cannot be insured, the lender faces an additional risk.
An uninsured property may therefore become difficult to mortgage.
That immediately reduces the number of potential purchasers. Fewer purchasers mean lower property values. In the worst cases, a house may become practically unsellable, even though it remains habitable.
Consider a household whose property has been valued at £300,000. If insurers withdraw cover because of repeated flooding, prospective buyers may be unable to obtain mortgages. The property could lose a substantial part of its market value.
The owners may still have an outstanding mortgage, but the value of the asset securing it has fallen.
If this happens to sufficient numbers of properties, the consequences could extend throughout the banking system.
The insurance industry whistleblowers quoted by The Telegraph have drawn comparisons with the financial crisis of 2008, when weaknesses in mortgage lending helped destabilise the international financial system.
The circumstances are different, and a comparable crisis is not inevitable. Nevertheless, the underlying warning deserves attention. An apparently secure financial asset can become much less secure when the assumptions supporting its value prove unreliable.
Governments can respond by constructing flood defences, improving drainage, strengthening buildings and restricting development in vulnerable locations.
But these measures require money, materials, energy and continuing maintenance.
Flood barriers must be inspected and repaired. Drainage systems must be maintained. Coastal defences must be strengthened as conditions change.
And protection is never absolute.
Britain already faces enormous demands for expenditure on roads, bridges, railways, water supplies, electricity networks, hospitals and other essential infrastructure.
Climate adaptation adds another expensive obligation.
In an expanding economy, governments might reasonably expect rising tax revenues to finance much of this expenditure.
But what happens in a shrinking economy?
If the economy is contracting because the cost of obtaining and delivering energy is rising, the resources available for maintaining existing infrastructure will become increasingly constrained.
The country may face a growing requirement for protective expenditure at precisely the time when its ability to finance that expenditure is weakening.
This is a central problem of the post-growth economy.
The threat of uninsurable homes is only one aspect of a much larger issue.
Britain’s housing market depends upon a complicated combination of mortgage lending, insurance, employment, household incomes, infrastructure and confidence in future property values.
All these are vulnerable to economic contraction.
If real household incomes decline, fewer people can afford existing house prices.
If unemployment rises, mortgage repayments become more difficult.
If energy costs increase, heating and maintaining properties become more expensive.
If public authorities cannot afford to maintain roads, drainage and other infrastructure, some locations may become less attractive.
Climate-related insurance problems add another pressure.
These pressures could reinforce one another. Falling property values might reduce household confidence and spending. Mortgage lenders might become more cautious. Construction activity could decline, reducing employment and demand for materials.
A property market that has benefited for decades from economic expansion could therefore become a source of instability during economic contraction.
This would be particularly serious in Britain, where so much personal wealth is tied up in residential property.
Britain already has a scheme known as Flood Re, designed to help make flood insurance available and affordable for eligible households at higher risk.
The scheme spreads some of the costs across the wider insurance market. It is currently intended to end in 2039, although its future is under discussion.
Such arrangements can provide valuable protection.
But they cannot eliminate the underlying physical risks.
If flooding becomes more frequent and damaging, somebody must ultimately bear the cost. That might be the homeowner, the insurance customer, the taxpayer or some combination of all three.
Government support can redistribute financial losses. It cannot make those losses disappear.
In a shrinking economy, this distinction becomes increasingly important.
There will be limits to how much expenditure can be transferred from one group of households to another, particularly when many households are already struggling to afford essentials.
Localism offers a different way of thinking about the relationship between settlement, property and economic security.
The present system treats houses primarily as financial assets. Their market values depend heavily upon the availability of credit, the expectations of purchasers and the assumption of future economic growth.
In a localist economy, the primary purpose of housing would increasingly return to providing secure and affordable shelter.
This does not mean that houses would cease to have monetary value or that private ownership would disappear. It means that their usefulness as places to live would become more important than their potential for capital appreciation.
Local knowledge would also become increasingly valuable.
People living within a locality often understand which fields flood, which roads become impassable, where drainage is inadequate and which buildings have survived difficult conditions over many generations.
Such knowledge could influence decisions about where to build, where to improve drainage and where further investment would be unwise.
Smaller-scale building and maintenance activities could increasingly draw upon local materials, local labour and established construction methods.
Traditional buildings sometimes offer useful lessons in ventilation, moisture management, repairability and the use of materials suited to local conditions. These lessons would need to be combined with modern knowledge of flood resilience and structural safety.
Localism would not prevent climate change or remove the need for national insurance arrangements and major flood defences.
Indeed, some problems, particularly coastal protection and the management of major river catchments, cannot be solved by individual localities acting alone.
There would still be an essential role for national government.
But local decision-making could help communities adapt their settlements to the resources and environmental conditions actually available to them.
There is another consequence which deserves consideration.
Britain has spent generations concentrating economic activity, employment and population in particular urban centres and development corridors.
This concentration has required increasingly elaborate infrastructure, including transport systems, drainage networks, electricity supplies and flood protection.
Some of this development has taken place on land which would previously have been considered unsuitable for housing.
As the costs of maintaining and protecting settlements rise, it may become necessary to reconsider where future development should occur.
A shrinking economy cannot indefinitely support every existing pattern of land use, particularly where protection requires increasing expenditure.
This does not mean abandoning established communities.
It does suggest that future settlement decisions should give much greater weight to long-term physical security, access to essential resources and the costs of maintaining infrastructure.
Localism would encourage settlements to develop in closer relationship with their surrounding land, water supplies, food production and available energy.
The objective would not be to maximise property prices, but to create communities capable of sustaining themselves with fewer external resources.
The insurance industry’s warnings reveal a weakness in the modern economy which is easily overlooked.
Much of our apparent wealth depends upon promises about the future.
A house is valuable partly because we assume that somebody will be able to purchase it. A mortgage is secure partly because we assume that the house will retain sufficient value. Insurance is affordable partly because we assume that future losses will remain manageable.
These assumptions depend upon physical conditions as well as financial arrangements.
When those conditions change, financial promises can become increasingly difficult to honour.
Climate change is one source of pressure. Rising energy costs, declining economic growth and the growing expense of maintaining infrastructure are others.
Together they raise a fundamental question.
Can an economy built around continually rising asset values remain stable when the physical costs of maintaining those assets are increasing and the resources available to meet those costs are becoming more constrained?
This is not merely an insurance problem.
It is another indication that the institutions developed during the age of economic expansion may be increasingly difficult to sustain in an age of contraction.
Localism will not provide an immediate solution to the insurance crisis. Nor will it protect every vulnerable property.
But it offers a different foundation for the future: one in which homes are valued primarily as places to live, communities make greater use of local knowledge and resources, and economic arrangements are shaped by what can realistically be maintained.
The growing threat of uninsurable homes may prove to be another warning that Britain needs to prepare for an economy in which maintaining what already exists becomes more important than pursuing further growth.
And that is precisely the economy for which Localism is intended.
Source: Harry Brennan, The Daily Telegraph, 14 October 2026, reporting warnings from senior insurance industry figures concerning climate risk, property insurability and financial stability.